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Current History

MAY, 1989

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In this issue, the latest developments in sub-Saharan Africa are discussed, including the peace accords in Namibia and Angola and the problem of African development. Evolving United States policy in the region is also evaluated. As our introductory article notes, "southern Africa could be a major testing ground for the [George] Bush administration, particularly testing its ability to forge a bipartisan foreign policy. . . ."

The American Challenge in Southern Africa

BY PAULINE H. BAKER

Senior Associate, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

PRESIDENT George Bush faces formidable constraints and fresh opportunities in southern Africa, a region that ranks, along with Central America, among the most controversial foreign policy flashpoints inherited from the administration of President Ronald Reagan. But the contrasts between these two regions are striking. In the interregnum between the Reagan and the Bush administrations, the American debate on Central America has turned a corner. Military support for the Nicaraguan contras has come to an end; the concerted diplomatic involvement of regional actors is assuming center stage; and efforts by the Bush administration to reach a compromise with Congress are under way.

None of these factors apply to southern Africa. On the contrary, President George Bush has reaffirmed his unstinting support for military aid to UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), the African equivalent of the contras; the superpowers rather than regional actors are framing a diplomatic settlement that is slated to take at least until mid-1991 to complete; and a political consensus remains elusive on a range of other issues in the region, including South Africa, one of the most inflammatory foreign policy issues in the American body politic.

Ironically, these trends are continuing despite—or, rather, in large part because of—the last-minute success of the Reagan administration in

brokering a settlement on Angola and Namibia.¹ This historic peace accord was a significant breakthrough. It offers the best hope yet of scaling down violence in the region and ending foreign intervention. It is also a personal triumph for United States Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, whose eight years in office created a record of its own. Crocker was the longest serving assistant secretary of state in the Reagan administration and he held the post of head of the Africa Bureau longer than any of his predecessors. Withstanding severe criticism in earlier years, including calls for his resignation because his policy of "constructive engagement" was seen as a tilt toward South Africa, Crocker exhibited extraordinary perseverance and patience that ultimately paid off.

Achieved just at the close of the Reagan years, the accord opens a new phase of American diplomacy, which the Bush administration must carry to completion. It thus represents the beginning, not the end, of a long process of conflict resolution. Besides transforming the strategic balance in southern Africa and bringing independence to Africa's last colony, the accord will test the endurance of superpower cooperation, since the United States and the Soviet Union are coguarantors of the agreement. Indeed, in southern Africa there has probably been more active collaboration between Moscow and Washington than there has been on any other regional conflict in which the superpowers were at odds. Thus, they have a strong interest in seeing that the peace agreement stays on track.

The settlement will also test the political commit-

¹"Tripartite Agreement on Southwestern Africa: Blueprint for Peace and Namibian Independence," *Southwestern Africa: Regional Brief* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, December, 1988).

ment of the signatory countries—Cuba, Angola and South Africa. Adherence to the peace process significantly alters their political and military status. In exchange, the signatory countries have the chance to usher in a new era of regional peace and economic development, after more than a decade of unrelenting war, economic deterioration and human suffering.

The peace pact also represents a challenge for the United Nations (UN), which has scaled back the size of the Namibian operation from the original 9,500 civilian and military personnel called for in UN Resolution 435 to, roughly, 6,000. But even after this reduction (which was insisted on by the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council who are footing the lion's share of the bill), the project remains the most ambitious peacekeeping operation in the history of the organization. Its overall mission in support of the accord involves monitoring the cease-fire and verifying Cuban and South African troop withdrawals from Angola and Namibia, respectively, and overseeing the release of political prisoners, the repeal of apartheid laws, the conduct of at least one election for a constituent assembly (and possibly another for a new government), the drafting of a constitution and the transition to independence in Namibia, a territory twice the size of Texas, with a population of 1.5 million.

THE PEACE PACT

The regional accord signed December 22, 1988, establishes a 27-month schedule for the gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the implementation of the UN plan for the independence of Namibia. Requiring a series of parallel military and political steps, the complex agreement will be the central priority of the Bush administration in southern Africa, occupying much of its at-

²Ibid.

³The 1984 agreements, for example, known as the Nkomati Accord (between South Africa and Mozambique) and the Lusaka Accord (between South Africa and Angola), both collapsed due to violations on the battlefield and secret supplies by Pretoria to rebel forces. In the tripartite accord on southwestern Africa, there is a mechanism for dispute resolution, known as the Joint Commission. It went into effect immediately after the agreement was signed in December to interpret provisions of the agreement and mediate conflicts. However, no penalties are specified if the commission determines that there have been violations. Ultimately, enforcement depends upon the parties themselves. The Joint Commission consists of the United States, Angola, Cuba, South Africa and, on independence, the Namibian government.

⁴See, for example, the paper prepared by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, entitled "Resolution 435: Treatment of Military and Police in Namibia," dated January 24, 1989. It raises questions about the reduction of UN peacekeeping forces, the deployment of numerous territorial troops, reports of new irregular forces being trained in secret to disrupt elections, and other alleged abuses.

tention until July, 1991, when all Cuban troops are to be withdrawn from Angola.

The terms of the agreement demand constant vigilance and careful monitoring. The agreement calls for 3,000 Cuban troops to leave Angola by April 1, 1989, a deadline that Havana announced it had met months ahead of schedule as a gesture of good faith. In addition, 25,000 troops, 50 percent of the Cuban troops, are to be out of Angola by November, 1989; 33,000, or 66 percent, out by April, 1990; and all Cuban troops out by July, 1991. Correspondingly, April 1, 1989, is D-Day for the start of the UN plan for Namibia, although the specifics of this section of the accord are not so precise. According to published documents, there is no fixed date for Namibia's independence. However, the schedule of events listed in State Department materials indicates that by July, 1989, all South African troops should be out of Namibia except for a residual force of 1,500 confined to base; and the rest are to withdraw by November, 1989, when Namibian elections should be held.²

The international celebration surrounding the accord, while justified, has nevertheless obscured the underlying distrust among the signatories, who exchanged angry words at the signing ceremony in New York City and who immediately began accusing each other of bad faith. Other parties that remain deeply suspicious of the accord include elements of the South African military, and guerrilla forces like UNITA, the antigovernment rebel movement seemingly left out in the cold. These parties have the ability to threaten the successful implementation of the settlement, just as previous regional agreements that once inspired hope were suddenly torpedoed without warning.³

Moreover, in the rush to get the agreement signed before the end of the Reagan era, many loose ends were left unresolved. The ongoing war in Angola is the most immediate. While jockeying for international support by alternately proposing new initiatives and threatening new military offensives, the rival UNITA and MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) forces seem no closer to a settlement now than they were before the accord. There is also considerable uncertainty about South Africa's underlying intentions in Namibia, where electoral manipulation and military subterfuge could create problems for a smooth transition.⁴ Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water port, remains in South Africa's hands and is sure to be discussed in the future as an anomaly compromising Namibia's independence. And, thus far, there has been no clarification about the political stalemate in the United States that resulted in the 1988 failure to obtain a congressional appropriation of \$150 million, the estimated United States share of the

peacekeeping costs. While the Bush administration has assured Congress that it will back UNITA, congressional supporters of UNITA have hinted that they might tie future funding to a resolution of the Angolan civil war that ensures UNITA a role in the central government.

Verification concerns expressed on both sides will continue to stalk the process, when an estimated 100,000 Cuban and South African troops pull back from confrontation in an area that is roughly comparable in size to the United States east of the Mississippi River. In addition, United States relations with Angola have not been normalized. Administration spokesmen and congressional sources have suggested that in addition to the removal of Cuban troops, new conditions could be laid down before diplomatic relations are established, including national reconciliation and an end to Soviet assistance to the Angolan government.

Beyond the agreement, the most critical issues that stir the American debate on southern Africa are covert aid to UNITA and the insurgency in Mozambique, and United States policy toward South Africa. Each raises questions about the appropriate role of the United States in a region that traditionally lies just on the periphery of American international concerns. As the 1990's approach, however, southern Africa—while still low on the United States foreign policy totem pole—is gradually assuming greater salience in the hierarchy of international priorities as American involvement in the area intensifies.

REGIONAL ISSUES

In what the *Washington Post* described as his first foreign policy commitment, President George Bush wrote a letter to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi two weeks before Bush's inauguration, promising "all appropriate and effective assistance" in order "to provide maximum support to a process of negotiation leading to national reconciliation."⁵ UNITA guerrillas are regarded by supporters of the Reagan Doctrine as "freedom fighters," and Savimbi is portrayed as a charismatic exponent of democracy and free enterprise. Nevertheless, today the guerrilla movement is poised on what may be the most delicate tightrope in its existence. While President Bush's statement of support was welcome news to Savimbi, it was little consolation for the cutoff of direct South African military and financial assistance. Pretoria's agreement to end aid to UNITA was the

quid pro quo for Angola's agreement to close down the military bases of the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's oldest liberation movement.

Deprived of South African air cover and ground support, as well as South African-supplied matériel, UNITA is more dependent than ever on the United States. Since 1986, Washington has helped Savimbi through a covert military program, reported to have reached an annual level of \$15 million, that operates out of Zaire. There is substantial support for UNITA on Capitol Hill, including support from some Democrats. But the United States military program could be as threatening to the Bush administration's relations with Congress as the contra aid program was for the Reagan administration.

Similar anti-Marxist insurgencies funded by the United States in other regions are winding down just as support for UNITA appears to be increasing. In the wake of the regional agreement, administration officials are reported to be assessing the need for additional aid to offset the loss of South African assistance. Moreover, the UNITA operation seems to be shaping up more as a litmus test of conservative loyalty to the anti-Marxist strategy identified with Ronald Reagan than as a political strategy for achieving long-term peace and stability in Angola. Critics see Savimbi, not as a pro-Western freedom fighter but, as one observer put it, as "a political chameleon of passing persuasion but steady ambition."⁶ They argue that American military aid erodes Washington's ability to act as an honest broker, inflames rather than resolves the civil war in Angola and undercuts American credibility and influence in Africa as a whole. South African blacks, for example, cite United States aid to UNITA as evidence of their perception that the United States silently supports South Africa.

A second source of controversy is the ongoing right-wing RENAMO (the Mozambican National Resistance) insurgency in Mozambique. After years of deadly warfare and economic mismanagement, this former Portuguese colony has in effect become a ward of the international community. Malawi, Tanzania and, most of all, Zimbabwe have deployed troops in Mozambique to defend their outlets to the sea; the British supply military training to the Mozambican army; and the Western world is shoring up the economy with economic aid, including more than \$450 million pledged for the rehabilitation of the Beira Corridor, the central railway, road, pipeline, port and town that serves as a vital outlet to the sea for the region as a whole.⁷

Yet, for all this assistance, Mozambique continues to reel from the brutal activities of RENAMO, which consists essentially of bands of marauding guerrilla fighters originally created as a

⁵ *Washington Post*, January 12, 1989, p. 1. The letter was dated January 6, 1989.

⁶ John A. Marcum, "Africa: A Continent Adrift," *Foreign Affairs*, 1988/89, vol. 68, no. 1, p. 162.

⁷ *The New York Times*, February 21, 1989, p. 4.

fifth column by the white minority regime in Rhodesia. Since 1980, when Zimbabwe gained its independence and South Africa took over responsibility for training and equipping the rebels, RENAMO has intensified its attacks. Several sources, including the United States State Department in a report issued in 1988, describe RENAMO as a force that regularly commits atrocities and that lacks a coherent program and clear leadership. The State Department report concluded that the right-wing rebels had killed at least 100,000 Mozambicans and had turned one million others into refugees.⁸

Having had a role in creating this undisciplined force—which, among other things, has attacked pylons from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project that supplies power to Pretoria—South Africa decided to distance itself from RENAMO in 1988. This was part of a wider campaign to improve South Africa's international image and mend fences with its neighbors after a decade of destabilization. Radically reversing its policy on Mozambique, Pretoria formally declared that it was no longer aiding RENAMO, though it never officially admitted to having done so as a matter of policy.

Pretoria also revived the 1984 nonaggression pact with Mozambique, known as the Nkomati Accord; concluded an agreement to upgrade the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique; supplied nonlethal military equipment to help defend the project's installations; and lifted restrictions on Mozambican migrant workers imposed in 1986. But there have been charges, emphatically denied by Pretoria, that the South African military is still secretly supplying RENAMO, and elements of the United States government, including the Defense Department and right-wing conservatives, remain sympathetic. In this context, Pretoria's suggestion, offered in February, 1989, that the United States and the Soviet Union should broker a settlement in Mozambique similar to the one negotiated in Angola, raises puzzling questions.⁹ Is there a genuine role for outside powers? Or is this an attempt to entice the international community into a process that would legitimize discredited rebels that still retain ties to their benefactor?

The third and most salient point of contention concerns South Africa itself. An important threshold was crossed in relations between Pretoria and Washington when sanctions were enacted by a

⁸See also the research report by William Minter, "The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) as Described by Ex-Participants," submitted to the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency, Washington, D.C., March 1989.

⁹See *Washington Post*, February 11, 1989, and *The New York Times*, February 12, 1989.

bipartisan vote of Congress in October, 1986, over the veto of a popular conservative President. Even with the margin of consensus that was built on outrage over the continuing violence and repression in South Africa, sanctions remain a matter of considerable debate.

There will be no going back on these measures unless and until there is significant progress in South Africa toward granting blacks full political rights. But it is an open question whether new sanctions will be adopted and, if so, whether they will be as extensive as those proposed in the so-called Dellums Bill, a measure that requires comprehensive sanctions. It is also unclear whether, in recognition of the established congressional position, the Bush administration will try to use sanctions creatively as a lever to exert influence on South Africa, along with diplomatic pressure and aid to antiapartheid groups. If so, the Bush administration would stand in stark contrast to the Reagan administration, which adopted a stance of blanket opposition to economic sanctions of any kind, regardless of egregious South African behavior, a position which led to a bitter confrontation with Congress.

It is possible that the Bush administration will move further than Ronald Reagan moved to harmonize United States policy toward South Africa with its allies, many of which are taking advantage of United States sanctions to advance their own trading relationships with Pretoria. Collaboration with the Soviet Union may also be in the cards. Moscow has not only worked with Washington on the Angola-Namibia settlement, but it has revised fundamental tenets of its approach toward South Africa by downplaying revolution, pushing for a political settlement, encouraging preservation of the economy and calling for recognition of the importance of ethnicity and group rights. Moscow has also expanded ties with liberal whites, academics and journalists in South Africa and is said to be exploring the merits of improving official ties with Pretoria. South Africa officials have even hinted at establishing relations with the Soviet Union.

For the United States, the search for an effective policy consistent with American values and strategic interests has put it in the curious position of both opposing and working with South Africa.

(Continued on page 245)

Pauline H. Baker was a professional staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with principal responsibility for Africa from 1977 to 1981. She is the author of the forthcoming Ford Foundation publication, *The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press).

Discussing the impact of international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on restructuring the economies of sub-Saharan Africa, our author notes that these institutions "have indeed taken on a considerable responsibility for Africa's economic and political future. But they do not have the power—or even at times the knowledge—to determine that future."

Economic Restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa

BY CAROL LANCASTER

Director, African Studies Program, Georgetown University

ECONOMIC restructuring has become high politics in sub-Saharan Africa. It is almost impossible to pick up an African newspaper or journal that does not have a front-page article on the topic. Nearly every government in the region has in place some form of economic restructuring program intended to reverse the economic decline of the past decade. Such programs are often controversial because they challenge long-established and widely shared economic beliefs and practices as well as entrenched interests. And since these programs typically have been shaped and financed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank with the backing of developed countries, they are often resented by Africans as having been imposed by outsiders in yet another assault on sub-Saharan Africa's sovereignty and self-reliance.

Economic restructuring covers a number of policy and institutional reform programs that are aimed at several objectives. During the early 1980's, many of these programs were intended to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating balance of payments in many African countries. Reforms like currency devaluation, reductions in government expenditures and limits on domestic credit creation were intended to reduce the deficit in the balance of payments by restraining demand, especially for imports, and by expanding production for export. Almost all reform programs of this type were based on "standby" or "extended fund facility" agreements with the IMF, under which the IMF lent foreign exchange at near commercial terms to African governments that would implement agreed economic reforms.

By 1983, it had become clear that few of the nearly 20 agreements between the IMF and the African governments had been successful. If there were a successful "IMF model" it would be a government with balance of payments problems that sought a loan of foreign exchange from the IMF. After the government and the IMF agreed on policy reforms, the IMF would disburse a por-

tion of the loan and the government would begin to implement the agreed changes. The IMF would then review the government's performance every three months and disburse further tranches of the loan when performance was acceptable. (When it was not, disbursements would be delayed until performance improved or the agreement was canceled and another negotiated.) Over a 12-to-18-month period, agreed reforms would be fully implemented and the promised loan monies would be fully disbursed. A balance of payments stabilization would be achieved, economic health would return to the borrowing country, and it would repay the IMF loan, usually over a three-to-five-year period. Thereafter, no further IMF loans would be needed.

This IMF model has almost never worked in sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, borrowing governments have frequently failed to implement fully agreed policy changes. When such changes have been implemented, they have failed to achieve significant and sustainable improvements in the balance of payments, usually because the effects of the changes have been blunted by unexpected shocks like droughts or collapses in export prices. Typically, in sub-Saharan Africa, governments have undertaken one stabilization program after another or have completed one program only to return to the IMF in a year or two to negotiate further loan programs without the achievement of equilibrium in their balance of payments or restored growth. The relationship that has developed between African governments and the IMF has become more like a contentious marriage than the short-term relationship that was originally intended.

By 1983, both the IMF and its critics had acknowledged that the IMF model was not working in sub-Saharan Africa. IMF management as well as some members of the IMF board were troubled by the fact that the IMF was making successive loans to African governments, so that its loanable funds, which were supposed to revolve,

were increasingly tied up in repeat programs. African officials and development experts recognized that the continent's economic malaise was more deep-seated than had originally been thought. They began to see that a broader, more sustained set of reforms over a longer period of time, combined with a larger amount of external financing, would be necessary if Africa's economic health were to be restored.

By the mid-1980's, the World Bank, with its large professional staff, its expanding resources and its support from industrialized countries, had begun to take the lead in promoting economic restructuring in sub-Saharan Africa through making an increasing proportion of its loans conditional on policy changes by borrowing governments. Some reforms in the World Bank's lending for structural adjustment were the same as those promoted by the IMF: exchange rate adjustments, limits on domestic credit creation, and reductions in government budgetary deficits. The World Bank typically followed IMF leadership in these areas. However, the Bank's objectives and the scope of its reforms went well beyond those of the IMF. Economic reforms in World Bank structural adjustment programs included increases in producer prices; the reduction or the elimination of subsidies; the liberalization of domestic and international trade; the reorganization, privatization and occasional elimination of government agencies; the restructuring of education and health systems; the revision of investment codes; and the development of multiyear investment plans. The objectives of these reform programs were increased production, investment and growth in borrowing countries, achieved by promoting a more efficient use of resources.

At the beginning of the 1980's, when it first began structural adjustment lending, the World Bank apparently believed that improved resource efficiency could be achieved by improving the operation of government. However, in its loan operations in Africa in recent years, the thrust of the Bank's structural adjustment programs has been to reduce the role of the state in the economy in favor of the private sector. Clearly, behind this shift is the World Bank's belief that many African governments lack the capacity to regulate their economies effectively or to operate productive enterprises efficiently. The Bank also assumes that with adequate incentives, the private sector, African or foreign, will be able and willing to increase existing production and, most important, to invest in new productive activities.

The relationship between the World Bank and African governments thus far has been more harmonious than the relationship between the IMF

and the Africans, which has often been marred by bitter controversy. But the World Bank's relationship with the African governments promises to be far more pervasive and potentially intrusive. The IMF has limited itself largely to promoting reforms in the area of currency adjustments and in fiscal and monetary policies. The World Bank has apparently put few limits on the scope of the economic reforms it is prepared to push.

Unlike the IMF, the World Bank has established resident missions in the capitals of most of the African countries that borrow from the Bank; these missions increasingly serve as the Bank's eyes and ears on the local economic scene. The Bank has frequently hired local economists to explain and analyze country economic problems and issues and, by implication, the political forces behind them. When its relationship with a key government minister has proved unsatisfactory, the World Bank has sent quiet missions to consult with the head of government. In contrast to the IMF, the World Bank has been concerned with its public image in Africa. It has convened conferences and consultations with prominent African academics and opinion makers, hiring a number of them as consultants.

The role the World Bank is carving out for itself in promoting structural adjustment in Africa is not limited to its relationship with African governments. Recognizing that the level of foreign aid is both an incentive and a necessary ingredient for a successful reform program, the World Bank has lobbied developed nations on behalf of Africans to provide increased aid in support of structural adjustment programs. The major vehicle for such lobbying is the consultative group mechanism. The World Bank normally convenes a consultative group, made up of bilateral aid donors and an African government, once the latter has adopted a sufficiently strong structural adjustment program. After reviewing the economic plans and progress of the African government, bilateral donors are expected to pledge additional amounts of aid in support of reform.

There are 16 consultative groups for sub-Saharan Africa, the most recently formed being a group for Nigeria. Today, the influence of the World Bank and the IMF on overall aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa is demonstrated by the fact that nearly all increases in aid since 1986 have gone to countries with economic restructuring programs supported by these institutions.

Like the IMF, the World Bank has established relationships of continual engagement with its African borrowers. But unlike the IMF, the World Bank's relationship with its borrowers appears to deepen over time as the scope of its reform pro-

grams expands. Each increment of World Bank adjustment lending is typically conditioned on an additional set of reforms by African borrowers. In the case of Ghana, for example, the World Bank began its lending for structural adjustment by financing the rehabilitation of the export sector. Its loans and the reforms associated with them have gradually expanded to include the agriculture, finance and education, health and public enterprise sectors.

The World Bank and the IMF frequently operate in the same countries. Typically, a government with a serious foreign exchange shortage or a need to reschedule its debt will be required by its foreign aid donors and its debtors to negotiate an agreement with the IMF before more aid can be considered or before its debts can be rescheduled. Such an agreement with the IMF is often followed by a structural adjustment loan (SAL) from the World Bank and, eventually, a consultative group meeting with foreign aid donors. (The World Bank will rarely make a structural adjustment loan unless an IMF program is in place. It will, however, make smaller, sectoral adjustment loans or finance investment projects in the absence of an IMF program.)

A snapshot of the scope of structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa shows that a handful of countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius and Swaziland) have no adjustment programs in place; a group of four countries (Burkina Faso, Benin, Ethiopia, and Rwanda) have put in place their own adjustment programs without international financial institution (IFI) engagement; a group of three countries (the Congo, Lesotho and Cameroon) have IMF-supported stabilization programs; a group of 22 countries are committed both to stabilization programs (usually with IMF support) and to broader World Bank-supported structural adjustment programs; and a final group of countries, including Zambia, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, have begun and later aborted adjustment programs.

Over the past several years, more countries have moved from no adjustment programs to their own adjustment programs to IMF stabilization programs and, subsequently, to World Bank structural adjustment programs. It is still unclear whether the trend toward more adjustment and greater IFI engagement or the trend away from adjustment and IFI engagement will eventually predominate.

An examination of economic restructuring programs offers only a temporary impression of the course of structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa, because individual countries move in and out of different categories. More troubling, it is often difficult to estimate just how far particular governments have gone in implementing structural

adjustment programs or whether reforms have been reversed or undermined after they have been implemented. For example, governments dismissing civil servants in the course of streamlining or eliminating government agencies occasionally re-employ them elsewhere. Governments have also implemented reforms by changing laws or regulations without telling the public. To understand the details of economic restructuring in sub-Saharan Africa normally requires more information than is publicly available. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence suggests that important changes in economic rhetoric and policies are taking place throughout sub-Saharan Africa, usually in the context of World Bank and IMF programs.

The role of these two institutions in influencing current economic policy decisions in sub-Saharan Africa has never been greater. How can one conceptualize that role? Some have termed it "neocolonialist," while others have described it as "tutelage." A few observers in Africa and elsewhere have described it in terms that are not printable here. In reality, there does not seem to be a concept that can accurately capture the relationship between the IFI's and African governments. It is not neocolonialist, since that term implies that the IFI controls decisions regarding African economic policies and institutions. Neither the World Bank nor the IMF has such control. African officials remain the final decision makers; they have often disregarded the advice and preferences of the IFI's. On the other hand, the concept of "tutelage," usually defined as "guiding," is also inadequate in describing this relationship. The IFI's are acting as more than guides in helping African governments in restructuring. They exercise considerable leverage on African governments desperate for foreign exchange, by making their own financing and their efforts to mobilize financing from other sources conditional on reforms. These institutions cannot make restructuring decisions for the Africans, but they can make the cost very high for Africans who refuse to undertake a program of economic restructuring acceptable to the IFI's.

However, African governments are not passive. The competition between East and West and among Western aid donors themselves to promote their own influence in sub-Saharan Africa has all but vanished, depriving Africans of the opportunity, often exploited in the past, to play one government off against another to maximize the amount of foreign aid and minimize the influence of aid donors. Nevertheless, African governments with Western "patrons" have attempted to persuade their patrons, principally France and the United States, to intervene with IMF and World Bank management to ease the conditions of stabilization or struc-

tural adjustment loans. It is not known how often this tactic has been used successfully. But there are several documented cases where it has been tried.¹ It is likely to be more common than these few cases suggest. Another tactic, thus far apparently little used, is for an African government to pit the IMF against the Bank. There are potential opportunities for such tactics where the two institutions disagree on appropriate policy reforms. According to the World Bank and IMF staff, however, this seldom happens—at least, not in the presence of Africans. The staffs of the two institutions carefully avoid creating opportunities for divide-and-rule tactics by Africans; instead, they resolve any disagreements before negotiations begin on lending programs. Increasingly, the World Bank and the IMF staffs work out their differences in the preparation of a policy framework paper for each borrower, which includes major reform strategies.

The experiment in economic restructuring in sub-Saharan Africa began in the early 1980's and has gained momentum as more countries have initiated, sustained and expanded reform programs. What have been the results thus far of this experiment? In a growing number of countries, agricultural production has picked up and growth rates have improved. But there are still no clear-cut success stories of economic restructuring to show how a country has regained economic ground and achieved sufficient expansion to sustain long-term growth.

Ghana is usually cited as the most successful example of economic reform. Growth rates over the past four years in Ghana have exceeded 5 percent for the first time since independence in 1957. But these growth rates mainly reflect a recovery from a depressed level of economic activity produced by decades of mismanagement. Recovery will turn into sustained growth only when a substantial amount of investment in new productive activities is forthcoming. The experience of Ghana thus far is not reassuring. While some new investment has occurred in gold mining and in timber, there are already threats of disinvestment in manufacturing as inefficient industries collapse in the course of trade liberalization. And, according to World Bank officials, the overall level of savings and investment in Ghana has begun to fall rather than to rise.

IMPROVING TECHNOLOGIES

Another challenge facing Ghana and the rest of Africa in turning economic recovery into sus-

tainable growth is developing and delivering improved agricultural technologies to enable farmers to increase their overall productivity. What is needed in agriculture is already known. The basic technologies are available to permit greater productivity. What is lacking are the local research, extension and credit institutions that can adapt to and deliver the new technologies and the necessary inputs to farmers.

In the manufacturing and service sectors, there are greater uncertainties. It is not known when or from where new investments in manufacturing or services are likely to come—or whether they will appear at all in quantities significant enough to sustain economic growth. It is difficult to see who will invest in many of the smaller and poorer African countries. The amount of domestically financed investment is not likely to be large, and foreign investors, even where they are welcome, will be reluctant to risk their funds in the poor, small, often landlocked and occasionally politically unstable countries that make up much of Africa. In the best of circumstances, economic reforms may slowly stimulate private investment and lead to renewed growth. In some countries, the private sector, foreign or domestic, may not be sufficiently robust or sufficiently interested to invest. These countries may see no alternative to bringing the state back in to lead development.

The current experiment in economic restructuring poses other challenges to African governments and to the international financial institutions as they become more deeply involved in African economies and societies. One challenge involves the impact of reforms on the poor and on politically significant groups.

Economic restructuring has two principal consequences: first, austerity programs usually result in a reduction in the quality and quantity of government services and, where user fees are imposed, they restrict the access of the rural and urban poor to health services and education. The poor and some members of the middle class are also hurt by increases in the prices of foodstuffs, transport and other goods and services when subsidies are reduced or prices decontrolled. And the urban poor and middle classes can be badly affected by government layoffs and the collapse of private firms in the face of increased foreign competition. Rising unemployment can have a ripple effect in the

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¹See C. David Finch, "Let the IMF Be the IMF," *International Economy*, January, 1988. Finch was a senior officer in the IMF who resigned in protest over the intervention of one of the fund's major directors in an attempt to influence the conditions of a lending program.

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In South Africa, "the turmoil of the mid-1980's was caused by the limited constitutional reforms introduced by [President] P.W. Botha. . . . In such a polarized political environment, changes of white leadership have minimal impact for blacks."

Politics in South Africa

BY PATRICK O'MEARA

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THE mid-1980's saw renewed turbulence in South Africa. Life in the African townships was marked by riots, police and military control and brutality, and the alienation of young blacks. Since then, successive states of emergency coupled with press controls and restrictions on black political and labor leaders have restored an uneasy semblance of political order. As South Africa moves into the 1990's, the important questions concern the mobilization of the black political opposition, the role of the black trade unions in bringing about a new political order and the viability of the prevailing white political and economic systems. In many ways, these issues are more significant than the issue of who would succeed P.W. Botha as President of South Africa.

Despite stringent controls, the government has been unable to curtail national strikes, boycotts, protests by church leaders, and acts of sabotage and bombings organized by the banned and exiled African National Congress (ANC). The government continues to rely on a nationwide state of emergency to maintain order because it believes that conditions for violence and civil disorder remain. The first state of emergency, instituted in July, 1985, was renewed in 1988, and it will undoubtedly be renewed later in 1989. Since the government is unwilling to share power with legitimate black leaders and groups, it has no option but to continue to use its police and military to maintain order. In 1988, the government widened its already extensive controls over black opposition groups with new regulations that severely curtailed all but the administrative activities of the 17 leading antiapartheid organizations, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the United Democratic Front (UDF).

The banning of newspapers is another example of the government's efforts to stifle the flow of information and control the black opposition. In 1988, the important Roman Catholic newspaper *The New Nation*, which has a circulation of approximately 60,000, was the first newspaper to be banned under the media restrictions added to the renewal of the state of emergency of August, 1987. The newspa-

per's editor, Zwelakhe Sisulu, was under detention at the time of the banning, although he has subsequently been released. In June, the South African government announced details of a further tightening of controls on the press. Specifically, it proposed that all local newspapers would have to register with the government, although foreign newspapers and full-time foreign correspondents were to be exempted from this requirement.

The direct impact of these measures would have been to silence the alternative press in South Africa and to all but eliminate free-lance or part-time journalists. Through these measures, the government hoped to limit reporting of human rights and other abuses. However, as a result of pressure from South African newspapers, and especially from some Afrikaans newspaper editors, the government backed down, saying that these regulations would be suspended pending further investigation. Nevertheless, it continued its offensive against newspapers that were outspoken in their criticism of government policies. Toward the end of the year, the liberal *Weekly Mail* was placed under a short-term ban under the censorship provisions of the state of emergency, because it was seen as a threat to the safety of the public and the maintenance of public order.

Even though there are severe limitations on black political activities, more than one million black workers joined a nationwide strike in March, 1988, to mark the 28th anniversary of the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre; this was followed by a strike of greater intensity and duration later that year when more than two million black workers went on a three-day strike organized by COSATU in protest against the crackdown against 17 antiapartheid groups and in opposition to a labor bill that would outlaw sympathy strikes and worker boycotts. The success of the strike was a clear indication that the government was unable to prevent extra-parliamentary black opposition. Indeed, with so few avenues for black political expression, strikes and stay-aways have become important forms of political expression in South Africa.

A recent move indicates that some black opposi-

tion groups may be attempting to operate within the system by working through municipal-level organizations. In Soweto, black councillors came to an agreement with activists and other leaders including Archbishop Desmond M. Tutu and Cyril Ramaphosa, head of the National Union of Mine-workers (NUM) over the long-standing rent crisis. In an unusual move, Samuel Mkhwanazi, the new mayor of Soweto, met with these antiapartheid leaders to resolve the \$70 million in arrears on rent payments resulting from the boycott and to renegotiate terms for future rent and electricity. Mkhwanazi and his supporters were clearly testing the autonomy extended to local black authorities; it remains to be seen whether the government will tolerate this internal form of confrontation.

Bombings have become a feature of daily life in South Africa. In 1988, in the Johannesburg area alone there were close to 100 bombings. Incidents included a car-bomb explosion as 10,000 spectators were leaving the Ellis Park Sports Stadium near Johannesburg after a rugby match. Most of the bombings were apparently carried out by African National Congress urban guerrillas, but some were the acts of right-wing extremists trying to intimidate liberal church groups and political organizations. At the end of August, Khotso House, the house of peace in Sotho that served as the headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and a number of other antiapartheid organizations, was destroyed in a bombing that injured 23 people. In November a bomb rocked the headquarters of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand. Both these bombings were presumably the work of white extremists.

WHITES MOVE TO THE RIGHT

On the whole, whites have accepted increasing state intervention and control of black political actions. There is now an even greater tolerance in South Africa for strong-arm measures and an increasing trust in the police and military. Indeed, the military's prominence in political decision making has increased through bodies like the State Security Council (SCC), and no political analysis is complete without an assessment of the military's role. For the moment, most whites continue to be secure in their suburbs, still protected under the terms of the Group Areas Act. Far from being more sympathetic to black political aspirations, an increasing number of whites have retreated to conservatism or to the extreme right.

In an apparent effort to counteract right-wing criticism, the South African government has proposed legislation that would more strictly enforce residential segregation. While the proposed new

legislation recognizes some existing multiracial neighborhoods or "gray areas," it proposes to amend the Group Areas Act to include provisions for the mandatory eviction of blacks who have moved into housing in areas reserved for whites. Under the present law, the state is obliged to provide alternative housing before it can evict violators. In the proposed amendment, there would be fines of over \$4,000 and penalties, including five years in prison, for those found guilty of illegally occupying or owning a property designated for a different racial group.

The Group Areas Amendment bill was opposed by all major parties except the right-wing Conservative party (CP) in the three-chamber Parliament. The Coloured Labour party in the House of Representatives maintained that residential segregation was evil and could not be amended, but had to be abolished. Continued adherence to the Group Areas Act is a clear indication of the government's concern with the electoral threat from its right.

The ruling National party (NP) lost two important Transvaal parliamentary seats, Schweizer-Renecke and Standerton, to the Conservative party in a March, 1988, by-election. In responding to the defeats, President P.W. Botha emphasized that the National party had won 133 seats in the 178-seat all-white Parliament in the general election held in May, 1987. On the other hand, political analysts in South Africa maintained that even though in the general election Andries Treurnicht's Conservative party had won only 23 seats, if a national election had been held in March, 1988, the Conservative party would probably have won a landslide victory over the National party.

In a third by-election on March 29 for the Randfontein Constituency in the Transvaal, the Conservative party won another substantial majority. Corne Mulder, the 29-year-old son of former Cabinet minister Connie Mulder, won the Randfontein seat held by his late father. His majority of 1,732 was more than double his father's majority in the May, 1987, general election.

Segregated municipal elections were held in October for white, black, so-called coloured, and Asian city or town councils. White councils were the most heavily contested, while many black seats were either uncontested or had no candidates. Black church leaders like Archbishop Desmond M. Tutu and the Reverend Allan A. Boesak had called for a boycott of the elections. The ruling National party once again faced strong competition from the Conservative party, and lost heavily to the right in rural areas and in industrial parts of the country. In three of the four provinces, however, it managed to maintain control but not in the heavily populated Transvaal province.

After the election, Conservatives controlled 60 of the 95 municipal councils in the Transvaal, but they were not able to take over the key cities of Pretoria and Johannesburg. The Progressive Federal party (PFP) increased the number of seats it held in the Johannesburg city council from 17 to 18 and, with the assistance of independents in Durban and Cape Town, it ensured that the councils would not be controlled by the National party. Most blacks boycotted the elections; there was a turnout of only 14 percent of eligible black voters on the national level. After the election, there was growing concern that the Conservatives would try to reinstate more orthodox or "grand" apartheid at local levels.

As a further sign of white movement to the right, after the election the council of the town of Boksburg, 15 miles from Johannesburg, voted to restore many of the petty apartheid restrictions that the government had repealed. The local municipal election had been won by the Conservatives, who decided to exclude blacks from parks, public toilets, sports facilities and other public places. It is interesting to note that among the critics of these retrogressive actions were National party leaders, including members of the Cabinet.

Despite the threat from the right, the National party continued to experiment with reforms. These measures, however, were inherently flawed because they did not address the central issue of more decisive power-sharing. New constitutional plans called for a National Council, which (the government claimed) would enable Africans to participate more directly in political affairs. Under this scheme, regional authorities would be set up for Africans living outside the homelands and there would be a National Council to which representatives from the regional authorities would be sent. In addition, the proposals provided for the inclusion of black leaders, either from the regional authorities or from the National Council, in the presidential electoral college. Conservative party leader Andries Treurnicht was highly critical of these new proposals because he feared the inclusion of blacks in the central government. Colin Eglin, leader of the Progressive Federal party, said that the proposals were inadequate because they avoided the central issue of the participation of blacks in Parliament.

White liberal political opposition groups remained demoralized as a result of their losses in the 1987 general election; but early in 1989 there were efforts to revitalize their fragmented activities. A new party, the Democratic party, came into being in April, 1989, bringing together the Progressive Federal party, the National Democratic Movement and the Independent party. The three parties now hold 20 seats in the white Parliament. The Demo-

cratic party hopes to be able to displace the Conservative party as the official opposition and to challenge the National party directly in the next general election. Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, who had been leader of the Progressive Federal party until he resigned from the party three years ago, agreed to be one of the four advisers to the new party.

In 1988, resistance increased among young white English-speaking South African males against the two years of military service followed by two months of active duty every year for 12 years as required by the national draft. In 1987, 23 draftees publicly announced that they would not serve and one of them was sentenced to 21 months in prison. In July, 1988, David Bruce argued before the courts that he would not serve in the military because it supported the racist system; he was sentenced to 6 years in prison. Two weeks later, 142 university students and graduates refused to serve.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Finance Minister Barend du Plessis introduced a fiscal year 1988-1989 budget to the South African Parliament on March 15, 1988, with major cutbacks in all areas except defense, which received a 22 percent increase; black education, which had received substantial increases in the past, received a 10 percent increase. Du Plessis maintained that because of the effects of sanctions, economic growth had been held back and unemployment, particularly among blacks, had increased. Figures issued by the United States Department of Commerce indicate that exports from South Africa to the United States dropped by more than 40 percent over the first nine months of 1987. For much of 1988, the price of gold was considerably down from its peak of \$500 an ounce at the end of 1987.

In June and July, 1988, United States Democratic party leaders advocated new measures that would intensify sanctions against South Africa beyond the limited sanctions implemented in 1986. At that time, a coalition of Democrats and Republicans came together to override a veto by United States President Ronald Reagan. The new provisions included a trade embargo and a nearly total ban on United States investment. United States corporations transacting business in South Africa or individuals with investments there would have a year to sell their holdings. All imports from South Africa, apart from strategic minerals and imports from businesses totally owned by blacks, would be banned, and so would nearly all United States exports to South Africa. However, these provisions were not acted on by the Senate at the end of the 100th session of Congress.

After meetings in Brazzaville, Congo, and

Geneva, Switzerland, and New York, South Africa, Cuba and Angola agreed to a cease-fire. Through the active mediation of the United States, the parties agreed to a withdrawal of South African troops from Angola by September 1, 1988; Angola and Cuba agreed to establish a timetable for the removal of almost 50,000 Cuban troops. The next stage would be a United Nations independence plan, which was scheduled to go into effect on April 1, 1989, and which should lead ultimately to United Nations-sponsored elections by November 1, 1989. After the successful withdrawal of South African troops, conditions seemed favorable for an end to more than 20 years of warfare in Namibia and a possible end to the 13-year civil war in Angola between the government forces backed by Cuba and the rebel Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces, supported by South Africa and the United States.

BOTHA'S WANING DAYS

After ten years in power, President P.W. Botha relinquished the leadership of the ruling National party in February, 1989, after suffering a mild stroke. The final choice of Botha's successor as party leader was in the hands of the 131-member caucus of the National party, which elected the minister of national education, F.W. de Klerk, to the party leadership. However, if Botha decides to retire as President, the new President would be chosen by an electoral college representing all three houses of the tricameral Parliament (in which the majority of the members of the white Parliament hold the decisive vote). De Klerk, who is not perceived as a hard-line *verkrampste*, has been leader of the National party in the more conservative Transvaal Province since 1982. Most white South African politicians see him as a pragmatic choice and it is anticipated that, if chosen as President, he would continue the limited reforms that have been instituted by Botha.

Other potential contenders for the presidency include the Acting President, Chris Heunis, who had been minister of constitutional development and planning. He is not seen as a real challenger to F.W. de Klerk because of his obtuse personal style. In the 1987 election, Heunis held his Helderberg constituency in the Cape Province by a narrow majority of 39 votes, and recently his ministry was wracked by the publicity surrounding the loss of security clearance for two of its senior staff members. Indeed, for a while there were rumors that Heunis would be removed from the portfolio. However, as one of the senior Cabinet ministers he was a logical interim choice as Acting President. Roelof (Pik) Botha, the minister of foreign affairs, has had considerable visibility because of the successful Angola-Namibia agreement and because of

his attempts to foster dialogue with black heads of state, but he is unlikely to inspire the rank and file within the party caucus.

Barend J. du Plessis, the minister of finance, is young and has been developing a strong reputation for skilled management. Of all the contenders for the presidency, he is by far the most liberal. In the caucus that elected de Klerk to the party leadership, Pik Botha was knocked out in the first round and Heunis in the second. However, there was a very tight vote between de Klerk and du Plessis.

Because of the importance of the military in South African politics, especially in the powerful decision-making State Security Council, the minister of defense, former General Magnus Malan, cannot be discounted as a potential successor. His chances would increase if there were a drastic deterioration in the political climate in South Africa. The military is powerful and has the strong backing of most white South Africans, who still emphasize the importance of politics and of the political process. However, if the severe tensions of the mid-1980's were to return, Malan might be seen as the type of leader who would bring South Africa out of a period of crisis.

An important question, of course, is whether any change of leadership would have far-reaching consequences for black as well as for white South Africans. The appointment of F.W. de Klerk would mean that many of the reforms instituted by P.W. Botha would probably be continued.

P.W. Botha's reforms never went far enough because they were ultimately concerned with efforts to co-opt moderate blacks without fundamental power-sharing. The turmoil of the mid-1980's was caused by the limited constitutional reforms introduced by P.W. Botha in an effort to meet black demands for greater political participation.

Any President who attempted to turn back the clock to more orthodox apartheid could easily thwart these very tentative efforts at change. This would certainly delight the conservatives but could mean greater repression for black South Africans. Ironically, a return to orthodoxy might be the catalyst for widespread and extensive black mobilization against the regime. De Klerk would undoubtedly maintain the successive states of emergency under which South Africa has been governed

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Patrick O'Meara is the coeditor, with Phyllis M. Martin, of *Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986) and, with Gwendolen M. Carter, of *International Politics in Southern Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1982) and *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1982).

"Clearly, populism in Ghana and Burkina Faso was a common response to similar situations... In any event, populism and the 'Thermidorean reaction' that followed in Ghana and Burkina Faso represent stark political choices under very rigid constraints."

Populism in Ghana and Burkina Faso

BY DONALD ROTHCHILD

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IN the 1980's, the West African countries of Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) and Ghana, mired in poverty and dependency, turned in despair to experiments with home-grown populist regimes.* Radical, often Afro-Marxist in tone, these leftist populist regimes searched for authentic African solutions to the problems facing their countries. In principle, they rejected the individualism, acquisitiveness and transnational linkages they associated with capitalism; and while accepting many of the tenets of the Marxist-Leninist worldview, they failed in practice to build disciplined vanguard parties based on the principle of democratic centralism.

In their search for an authentic African development path, these regimes displayed many similar characteristics. First, they were committed in principle, and to some extent in practice, to eliminating class privileges and achieving the political and social equality of all individuals and groups. Second, they emphasized the value of social inclusion, and sought to give this value substance by stressing the importance of broad citizen participation in the public tribunals and decision-making committees of government. Third, they reorganized the institutions of state, dismissing many civil servants in the process, with an eye to ridding these organizations of personnel deemed corrupt or unsympathetic with the goals of the new regime. And fourth, they sought to transform their societies to eliminate the exploitative features of past regimes and to build a new, cohesive social order.

Moreover, in their rapid pursuit of these objectives, the leaders of these regimes displayed an element of recklessness and lack of regard for consequences that over time threatened regime stability, aggravated existing economic difficulties, and brought on a sharp counterreaction from groups affected by the shift in opportunity for advance-

ment. The result, both in Ghana and in Burkina Faso, has been a pattern resembling a "U-turn" where, in the face of severe political and economic constraints, the revolution turned to the right, mixing populist rhetoric with an increasing measure of pragmatism.

In discussing the background of the populist coups of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in Ghana on December 31, 1981, and those of Captain Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso on August 4, 1983, and his successor, Captain Blaise Compaore on October 15, 1987, it is important to distinguish between generalizable and situation-specific factors. In both countries, before the coups there was broad public resentment over evidence of extensive misuse of public office for private purposes. Poverty and class inequality were widespread, and these factors, combined with frustration over the rate of change, made the status quo relatively insupportable to many articulate professionals, trade unionists, students and, most ominously for those in power, to many in the lower ranks of the military. The combination of resentments, frustrations and continuing expectations of a possible improvement in conditions all represented a common backdrop for a determined opposition movement; in Ghana and Burkina Faso, this (not surprisingly) culminated in military intervention.

When intervention came, a large constituency was in place that could support the militant young officers who assumed control of the state. Such support at the outset of these revolutions contributed substantially to regime legitimacy, enabling the new rulers to mobilize the populace for the maintenance of public order and economic and social development. The sense of drift and lack of purpose gave way to a new national direction, giving the public a much needed uplift, albeit in the short term, and the young military leaders won a credibility critical to their efforts at transforming their societies.

*This article was first delivered at the 31st annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, October 28-31, 1988.

The first of these radical populist coups occurred in Ghana in late 1981. Disappointed over the country's economic decline and the immobilism and corruption associated with the elected regime of Hilla Limann, a group of impatient young army officers and enlisted men seized power. The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) created a number of committees and tribunals in an attempt to involve the public actively in the processes of social and economic change. Jerry Rawlings's democratic revolution promised to create economic opportunities for the workers and the peasants, to redistribute wealth, to eliminate *kalabule* (various corrupt practices like hoarding, overpricing and smuggling), to end neocolonialist influences, and to forge close links with other populist-inclined states like Libya. The Rawlings agenda was a strong and inspired response to the lack of direction that had marked the past; the regime's first 18 months saw moments of exhilaration, satisfying to the urban proletariat, the unemployed, the lower ranks of the army, and some intellectuals, but frightening to many professionals, higher civil servants, successful traders and businessmen.

The second populist coup, in Burkina Faso, took place in 1983 and was modeled in part on the Ghanaian experience. Sankara, a radical young army officer who had long been in conflict with more moderate elements in the People's Redemption Council, had seen his fortunes rise and fall dramatically during the presidency of Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo. Appointed Prime Minister in January, 1983, Sankara was arrested and dismissed from office the following May. Some two weeks later, his fellow officer and sympathizer, Captain Blaise Compaore, mobilized a unit of paratroopers in Pô. Compaore threatened to march on the capital unless Sankara were released and reinstated in the army. Faced with this choice, Ouedraogo bowed to the inevitable and, in June, released Sankara.

A defiant Sankara quickly seized the political initiative. He forged new links with his radical compatriots in the army and then, with little resistance, acted abruptly to overturn the indecisive Ouedraogo regime. Ouedraogo, a former army doctor, was put under house arrest, accused of having betrayed "the patriotic and progressist [sic] objectives which justified the birth of the People's Salvation Council [CSP]" and having openly forged an alliance with "all conservative and reac-

tionary forces which know how to do nothing but serve the interests of the enemies of the people, the interests of foreign domination and neocolonialism."¹ In the eyes of the impatient, Ouedraogo lacked the necessary direction and commitment to change the worsening situation that confronted the country.

Like Rawlings before him, Sankara rejected the endless political compromises of the old ruling elite and sought a swift transformation of domestic and international policies. His revolutionary program was populist, not Marxist-Leninist. He did not try to abolish private property or to impose a Marxist-type vanguard party, but wanted to encourage broad public participation in the political process. "The primary objective of the revolution," he stated, "is to take power out of the hands of our national bourgeoisie and their imperialist allies and put it in the hands of the people."²

Internally, the Sankara government promised to mount a frontal assault on poverty, economic malaise and corruption; externally, it asserted its firm intent to align the country with other progressive, nonaligned states and to eliminate lingering neocolonial influences. No initiative was more expressive of Sankara's bold resolve to follow an independent course than his policy of strengthening ties with Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's Libya. Although the Libyan connection proved more symbolic than substantive, it identified the Sankara regime with progressive forces in the third world.

THE POPULIST REGIME IN GHANA

In Ghana, the populist nature of the 1981 Rawlings regime was clear at its outset. On the day of the coup, Rawlings declared that he wanted a "social revolution" and toward that end he called for broad popular involvement in overseeing state policy-making and governance. He charged Ghanaians with the task of eliminating the vestiges of inequality and exploitation and protecting Ghana from foreign interference. Rawlings emphasized that he did not seek to impose himself on the country; what he sought was a "chance for the people . . . to be part of the decision-making process."³

Populist rhetoric and symbolism were very much in evidence in the early stages of the Rawlings revolution. Slogans like "power to the people" "popular justice" and "participatory democracy" were used widely, and the prefix "people's" was attached to such national institutions and organizations as the army, the police and the daily newspapers. The leader of the populist revolution, often clad in battle fatigues, was constantly in the public eye; his slogans were on countless bill-

¹*Africa Research Bulletin*, vol. 20, no. 8 (September 15, 1983), p. 6957.

²Quoted in Guy Martin, "Ideology and Praxis in Thomas Sankara's Populist Revolution of August 4, 1983, in Burkina Faso," *Issue*, vol. 15 (1987), p. 78.

³*Daily Graphic* (Accra), January 1, 1982, p. 1.

boards. Supporters of the "popular government" held rallies (sometimes referred to as "durbars") to denounce imperialism and "retrogressive social forces" and to reaffirm the principle of giving power to the people. It was a time of general excitement and exhilaration.

The initial populist coalition included a variety of Ghanaian social interests. Prominent in the new ruling group were urban-based workers and trade unionists, university students (especially those organized under the National Union of Ghana Students—NUGS), radical intellectuals, anti-establishment professionals, junior officers and enlisted men, and the rural and urban unemployed and working poor. Such a broad-ranging coalition strengthened Rawlings during the first 18 months of his rule, enabling him to put a variety of political and social changes into effect. However, as the constraints of the domestic and international environment became apparent, the Rawlings government was forced to reorder its priorities, causing some progressive elements who felt disadvantaged to lose faith and break ranks.

The PNDC government established institutions to give expression to the call for public participation and watchfulness. People's Defense Committees (PDC's) and Workers Defense Committees (WDC's) were set up at community, workplace, district, regional and central levels. It is important to note that there was a spontaneous element in the way many of these organizations sprang up in response to Rawlings's appeal to the people to form committees for the defense of the revolution.⁴ Popular justice was to be exercised through the PDC's and the WDC's, and, in particular, through such newly created extra- or quasi-judicial bodies as the Citizens Vetting Committees (CVC's), the National Investigations Committee (NIC), and the Special Military Tribunals.

The PNDC authorized the CVC's to examine the assets and bank accounts of anyone with a balance of ₵50,000 (approximately \$16,000 at the official rate of exchange) or higher. The government also gave the CVC's permission to investigate cases of alleged tax avoidance and default and to invoke the appropriate penalty in the event that laws were broken. The NIC, moreover, was empowered to investigate the accounts and finances of anyone referred to it; it was also authorized to deal with other known cases of corruption. PNDC Law No. 2 of February 5, 1982, enabled the NIC to arrest and detain persons in the course of investigations and to freeze their assets.

These extra-legal institutions adopted a pronounced populist tone. They delivered what one

pro-PNDC group called "simple, straightforward justice rather than the confusing 'I put it to you' rubbish." The "popular" courts meted out heavier and sometimes unusually harsh penalties. Sentences of 60 years (with part of the time at hard labor) were not unusual.

In terms of administrative and management style, populism was expressed through the establishment of Interim Management Committees. These committees replaced management boards and governing councils in both the public and private sectors.⁵ In the heady days of the Rawlings revolution, the workers apparently overturned the traditional top-down management system. Junior workers used their new powers to demand their participation in the management process, to protect their jobs, to oppose retrenchment programs, and to correct what they perceived as long-standing grievances. Workers in various organizations reportedly locked out their management. They also overturned disciplinary measures taken against insubordinate workers, reinstated dismissed workers and countermanded management policy decisions. Perhaps the WDC takeover of the Ghana Textile Printing Company, a joint venture of the United Africa Company and the Ghanaian government, was the high point in worker assertiveness on the national scene.

Price, rent and transport fare controls were put into effect, enforced energetically by militant elements in the army, the police, the PDC's and the WDC's. In instances allegedly involving hoarding and overpricing, populist vigilantes confiscated the goods of hapless traders, often selling them off to the public at reduced prices. In extreme cases, sheds and tables were destroyed and whole markets were razed. By and large, government leaders approved of these attacks on profit-seeking traders, wanting to channel consumer goods through publicly owned People's shops. In actions subsequently backed by the PNDC decrees, militant elements also imposed reductions in rents and ordered landlords to rent unoccupied rooms and houses or face outright confiscation. In one instance, the owner of an 18-room house was reduced to the status of a tenant and made to pay rent to a former tenant designated as the building's caretaker. An order also called on senior public servants to surrender any vacant servant quarters for use by workers in need of housing.

Populist mobilization, a mixture of voluntary commitment and compulsion, became the chief instrument of Ghana's economic development. Students from the three universities and other institutions of higher learning were encouraged by NUGS to leave their campuses and to constitute themselves as a "task force" to move the cocoa and

⁴*Daily Graphic*, January 6, 1982, p. 1.

⁵PNDC Law No. 6, 1982.

other cash crops locked (by bad roads and lack of transport) in the hinterland. To accomplish this task, NUGS commandeered private and public bulk haulage vehicles. In the same spirit of populist fervor, students, PDC's and various voluntary organizations mobilized (and forced road construction contractors and others) to participate in an effort to rebuild the roads.

The regime tried to promote agricultural development, using the newly constituted people's and cooperative farms. The PNDC banned the purchase and use of farm tractors by private individuals; henceforth, such machinery was to be deployed only on public farms. Moreover, after completing a program of character remolding, once-idle youths, male and female, were to be directed to agricultural activities. In this, the regime apparently relied on their patriotism and commitment to the goals of the revolution at least as much as on coercive measures.

In the course of mobilizing public support for PNDC purposes, various establishment groups (the professionals, mercantile and management classes, and so forth) and institutions (the churches, especially with overseas links, the judiciary, the bar and other professional associations, and traditional authorities) came under increasing attack. They were denigrated as neocolonial and regressive social forces that had to be eliminated. These traditionally dominant classes came to perceive themselves as the main targets of the purges and investigations of the postrevolutionary period. They resented the populist transformation for its severe penalties, its confiscations of property and other assets, its austerity and its criticism of their privileges and external ties.

BURKINA FASO

The parallels between the Burkinabé and Ghanaian revolutions are striking. Just as Rawlings had called for the formation of defense committees, Sankara created locally elected *Comités de Défense de la Révolution* (CDR's) in every rural village and urban neighborhood; he established new institutions, the *Tribunaux Populaires de la Révolution*, to administer popular justice; and he purged the army and bureaucracy of elements regarded as unsympathetic to the populist cause.

The CDR's were made responsible to the newly instituted *Conseil National de la Révolution* (CNR), a powerful organ at the political center, composed of key military and political elements prominent in the revolutionary movement. The *Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire Voltaïque*

(PCRVR) chose not to participate in CNR deliberations (although it did remain active in the CDR's);⁶ other left-wing political parties were influential, in the early stages at least, in the development of regime policies. These parties included the *Regroupement des Officiers Communistes* (ROC), the *Union des Luttes Communistes* (ULC) and the *Ligue Patriotique pour le Développement* (LIPAD).

The support of these organs and militant groups was critical to Sankara as he tried to put his populist program into effect and to curb the powers of the country's middle class and traditional authorities. His abolition of private landownership severely limited the influence that the traditional chiefs could wield; in addition, his reduction in the numbers and salaries of civil servants greatly affected their status. However, Sankara encountered the limits of his authority as he sought to control the trade unionists, who retained their powerful hold on their union organizations and maintained close ties with political parties like LIPAD and PCRVR.

As in Ghana, the populist forces employed forcible measures to introduce factory-floor democracy and self-management. They often took matters into their own hands, removing corrupt or incompetent parastatal managers and establishing interim management committees. In September, 1983, workers at Voltelec, the state electricity company, seized control of the firm and secured the dismissal of the director. Similar incidents occurred in the Post and Telecommunications Corporation when workers insisted on an expanded role in the company's decision-making process.

Populist forces in Burkina Faso also made use of their newly found power to impose and enforce controls on prices, rents and transportation fares. In events reminiscent of events in Ghana in 1982 and 1983, markets were burned down, traders were driven from the sidewalks and grain speculators were ruined. The new militants forced landlords to reduce their rents; they also ordered wealthier property owners to build housing for their workers (a demand that inspired a precipitous flight of capital to neighboring countries in French-speaking Africa). Later, in 1985, the payment of rent for private housing was eliminated entirely.⁷

(Continued on page 241)

Donald Rothchild, the coeditor of *Afro-Marxist Regimes* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987), has been a visiting professor in political science at the University of Ghana, Legon. E. Gyimah-Boadi has collaborated several times with Donald Rothchild, and traveled with him in Ghana and Burkina Faso during the summer of 1988.

⁶Eboe Hutchful, "New Elements in Militarism," *International Journal*, vol. 41, no. 4 (Autumn, 1986), p. 825.

⁷*Daily Graphic*, January 4, 1985, p. 2.

"As an independent country, Namibia will remain dependent on South Africa for transport, trade and, probably, currency transactions. ... The economic dislocation and tribal separation fostered by South Africa's long occupation of the country will be slow to disappear."

Namibia's Transition to Independence

BY VIRGINIA CURTIN KNIGHT

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EVENTS in southwestern Africa beyond the borders of Namibia have once again brought this nation close to independence. In the past, disappointment and broken commitments have taught Namibians to be skeptical of promises from South Africa, which has controlled Namibia since 1915. In 1988, circumstances changed; today South Africa has new reasons to end its occupation and implement United Nations (UN) Resolution 435 (1978). Resolution 435 calls for UN-supervised elections for a constituent assembly in Namibia, to be held seven months after implementation begins. Implementation was scheduled for April 1. Even independent Namibia will be encumbered by South Africa's legacy—hobbled by an import-oriented economy, divided by exaggerated ethnic loyalties and swamped by a debt burden incurred by South Africa to sustain its occupation.

Until 1968, Namibia was known as South West Africa. It takes its name from the Namib Desert, one of the oldest deserts in the world, located along the south Atlantic Coast and bordering South Africa, Botswana, Angola and Zambia. Namibia has been a pawn in international politics since the missionaries and German settlers arrived in the mid-1800's. Germany declared South West Africa a colony in 1884; earlier, in 1878, Great Britain had annexed Walvis Bay (the country's only deep-water port). Between 1904 and 1907, Germany embarked on a settler policy, reinforced by German troops, that resulted in the death of more than 75,000 people, 60 percent of the population of central and southern Namibia.¹

After Germany was defeated in World War I, the League of Nations assumed responsibility for Germany's colonies. In 1920, the League gave South Africa a mandate to administer German South West Africa, promoting the people's "well-being and development." In 1925, the South African government enacted a constitution for South West Africa that gave South West whites limited autonomy. The constitution reserved con-

trol over customs, defense, foreign affairs, transport, justice and nonwhite affairs to South Africa. A white administrator general, appointed by South Africa, looked after South Africa's interests.

In 1946, the UN (which had placed the League of Nations mandated territories under its trusteeship) refused a South African request to allow South West Africa to become South Africa's fifth province. When the Nationalist party came to power in South Africa in 1948, it began consolidating its power base and it incorporated South West Africa into its political orbit, giving it representation in the South African Parliament. The Nationalists acted in defiance of an International Court of Justice ruling that the international status of South West Africa could be altered only with the consent of the UN.

In the late 1950's, black nationalist movements like SWAPO (the South West African People's Organization) and SWANU (the South West African National Union) were formed to resist South African domination. SWAPO was founded in 1960 (it was originally the Ovamboland People's Congress) by 30 or 40 Ovambo students and workers living in Cape Town. Key people were men like Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, Andreas Shipanga, Emil Appolus and Fanuel Kozonguizi.

South Africa maintained its control by force, stringent security laws and detention without trial. In 1960, the International Court was asked to rule on South Africa's failure to promote the welfare of the people. In a 1966 decision, the court refused to consider the question of South West Africa's status. African nations immediately put the question before the UN General Assembly. In October, the UN terminated South Africa's mandate and established a Council for Namibia to govern the country from the outside. The Council has had no practical effect; until recently South Africa has denied that the UN had any jurisdiction over Namibia.

In 1968, the UN Security Council declared South Africa's presence in the territory illegal; in

¹André du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1986), p. 45.

1969 it asked South Africa to withdraw, but South Africa refused. In 1971, after the Security Council asked the International Court for an opinion, the court reversed the 1966 decision, ruling that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal.

When the International Court failed to rule against South Africa, SWAPO began its armed struggle against South African occupation. In 1974, the UN recognized SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia. As the demand for sanctions against South Africa intensified, South Africa's principal trading partners formed the Contact Group to try to find a solution. The Contact Group consisted of representatives from the United States, Canada, Great Britain, West Germany and France, all members of the UN Security Council. The Contact Group submitted its plan to the Security Council, and in 1978 the Council unanimously adopted the plan as UN Resolution 435. The UN plan called for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia and for free and fair elections under UN supervision.

Meanwhile, in 1975, South Africa had formed the Turnhalle Convention, whose members it selected from the 11 designated ethnic groups. To protect white interests, all decisions were to be unanimous. The Convention failed to win internal recognition and in 1977 South Africa decided to turn it into a political alliance, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), to compete with SWAPO should there be elections. Eventually, South Africa refused to permit UN supervision of elections and in 1978 it called unilaterally for its own internal elections. Neither SWAPO nor the Namibia National Front (a coalition of groups opposed to the elections) participated. The international community regarded the elections as a sham and withheld recognition of the DTA.

South Africa has been delaying independence since the late 1960's. But recent political and military events in the region have persuaded South Africa that it is in its best interest to implement UN Resolution 435 and withdraw from Namibia. The sequence of events leading to the withdrawal began with a military coup in Portugal in 1974 and the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa. Portugal's hasty withdrawal from Angola, Namibia's neighbor to the north, left Angola without any central or established authority. The absence of government created conditions for a bloody civil war. The United States, South Africa, the Soviet Union and Cuba jumped into the fight for control. South Africa sent troops to support UNITA (the Union for the Total Independence of Angola); the United States originally backed Holden Roberto's FNLA (the Front for the National Liberation of

Angola) and later threw its support to UNITA. The Soviet Union and Cuba backed the MPLA (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). When South Africa invaded Angola in 1975 and pushed its way toward Luanda, the MPLA—the self-proclaimed government in Luanda—asked for Cuban military assistance to force the South Africans back across the border into northern Namibia.

South Africa continued to negotiate with the Contact Group, the UN and SWAPO into 1981. In 1982, South Africa again agreed to implement UN Resolution 435. However, the administration of United States President Ronald Reagan encouraged the South Africans to make implementation of the UN resolution conditional on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. The Angolan government refused to link Cuban troop withdrawal with Namibian independence. South Africa continued to occupy Namibia, with a force of about 100,000 troops stationed mostly along the northern border where it could strike into Angola and prevent SWAPO fighters from infiltrating into Namibia from Angola.

The situation changed in late 1987 and early 1988. Cuban pilots manning Soviet MiG-23's in support of MPLA troops won a decisive battle at Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola, forcing South African troops back across the border into Namibia. For the first time, the South African military had lost its air superiority—giving a tremendous psychological lift to the MPLA and SWAPO. South Africa went to the negotiating table in 1988 because it had lost its military advantage and because its occupation had become a financial burden.

POPULATION LABYRINTH

South Africa imposed its system of racial separation in Namibia in 1922 with the establishment of Native Reserves. By the late 1940's, racial separation was well established. In 1964, the Odendaal Plan, which institutionalized an already existing system, designated 10 ethnic groupings (there are now 11) and assigned each group to its own location. It reserved for whites nearly two-thirds of the total land area, with all the country's known base mineral deposits and diamond reserves, and the bulk of the commercially active agricultural and fishing sectors.

Namibia has a population of about 1.3 million in a country the size of Italy, West Germany and Great Britain combined. The population breakdown projected for 1989 is as follows: Ovambos, 641,000; Kavangos, 120,000; Hereros, 97,000; Damaras, 97,000; whites, 82,000; Namas, 62,000; Coloreds, 52,000; Caprivians,

48,000; Bushmen, 37,000; Basters, 32,000; and Tswanas, 8,000.²

By far the largest ethnic group is comprised of Ovambo speakers, about half the country's population. The majority of the Ovambos live in the north, in an area about 7 percent of the total territory. Many are migrant workers in the mines or the fisheries, or they live in Katutura, Windhoek's black township.

Throughout the German occupation, the Ovambos escaped domination because they lived north of the so-called red line, beyond the authority of German police, in an area forbidden to white settlers. Today, the line is ostensibly used to prevent hoof-and-mouth disease in cattle from spreading, but in practice it is manned by South African troops to control SWAPO activists.

The second largest population group is made up of Kavango-speakers, followed by the Damaras and the Hereros. The whites, who speak Afrikaans, German and English, are the fifth largest population group and control the country's economic resources.

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

The independence government will face enormous economic challenges. White and foreign control of economic resources has led to distortions in the national economy, the unbalanced provision of services and the extremes of wealth and poverty. Businessmen, ranchers and commercial farmers benefit most. Blacks living in urban areas generally subsist at the poverty level, while the people in "homelands," mostly women, old men and children, are the worst off. Oxfam estimates that the average ratio of white to black income is 18 to 1. The ratio of white to black per capita expenditure on medical services in 1984 was 8 to 1.³

About 90 percent of all the country produces is exported. Nearly all goods consumed, including basic foodstuffs, are imported. In addition, there is almost no manufacturing industry in Namibia. Most exports are primary or lightly processed commodities to be processed in industrial markets abroad. The manufacturing sector contributes 5 percent to the gross domestic product (GDP) and employs only 10 percent of the labor force in the formal sector. Most enterprises are located in Windhoek and specialize in meat processing, or supply services to the mining industry. Most industries are owned by German families or are sub-

sidaries of South African companies.

The commercial sector contributes 11 percent to the GDP and employs about 7 percent of the population. Low population density and South Africa's domination make the development of commerce difficult; South Africa provides 95 percent of all Namibia's imports (including basic commodities like maize, sugar, fruit and vegetables) and takes 15 percent of Namibia's exports. In the north, there is an extensive informal trading network because of the population density. Traders purchase goods in Windhoek or Tsumeb and take them north by van. The north has been occupied by South African troops for almost 13 years. When the military leaves, the local economy will lose its major employer.

The mining sector is the most important productive sector of the economy. It generates half of all public revenues and provides over 80 percent of total exports. Diamond mining alone provided nearly 13 percent of the public revenues derived from tax and duty in 1987-1988. All the major mines are operated by subsidiaries of multinational corporations; of the largest operations, CDM (Consolidated Diamond Mines) is a subsidiary of De Beers, part of the Anglo-American Corporation; Tsumeb Corporation, which mines copper and base metals, is a subsidiary of British-based Consgold, which is partly owned by Anglo-American; and the Rossing Uranium Mine is owned by the British corporation Rio Tinto Zinc.

The fishing industry has enormous potential for Namibia, but it has been seriously damaged from overfishing by South African cartels and fleets of international trawlers. South African authorities have not restrained the companies from depleting the pelagic fish stocks (pilchard and anchovy) and the fleets of foreign trawlers have fished with impunity in national waters because the government in Windhoek, regarded as illegal by the UN, could not declare an internationally recognized Exclusive Economic Zone.

An estimated 25-30 percent of the wealth generated in Namibia leaves in the form of corporate profits. The challenge for an independent Namibia is how to correct these distortions without destroying the economy.

CURRENT GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

South Africa has manipulated the government structure in Namibia for the past 70 years, always trying to control it and, in recent years, trying to make it look autonomous and acceptable to outsiders. The current multiracial structure is no exception. The DTA was shunned by the international community after the 1978 elections. As DTA chairman, Dirk Mudge tried to build a multiracial

²Population estimates have been calculated on an annual growth rate of 3 percent for all population groups, except for whites. The projected growth for whites is 1.5 percent per year. Section Liaison Services, Department of Governmental Affairs, *SWA/Namibia Today* (Windhoek: Department of Governmental Affairs, March, 1988).

³*Namibia: A Betrayal of Trust* (London: Oxfam, 1986).

coalition as a counter to SWAPO, but his close association with South Africa undermined DTA's credibility. To give itself more autonomy, the DTA walked out of the National Assembly in 1983 and, together with five other political groups—SWANU, SWAPO-D, the Labour party, the South West Africa National party and the Rehoboth Free Democratic party—formed a Multi-Party Conference (MPC).

In 1985, South Africa agreed to give the MPC some degree of "home rule." Subsequently, the six political groups in the MPC nominated 62 members for a National Assembly, to create the present Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU). The Assembly then elected an eight-member Cabinet. White interests are protected by the rule requiring the Cabinet to reach unanimous decisions. South Africa retains its control through an appointed administrator general who, next to the South African President, is the final authority. Like the MPC before it, the TGNU does not represent the majority. The internal wing of SWAPO refuses to participate, so does Ovambo administrative chairman Peter Kalangula, the Christian Democratic Action for Social Justice and the Damara Council headed by Justus Garoeb. Many smaller political parties have also refused to take part in the government.

In 1980, Namibia's central government created a system of second-tier administrations in each of the homelands. Each population group (except the Basters and the Bushmen) has legislative and executive powers and is responsible for providing local services like clinics, libraries, swimming pools, schools and social welfare facilities. This system has created great distortions, an enormous bureaucracy, and a tenfold duplication of services.

In his study of Namibia, human rights lawyer David Soggott writes,

The new constitutional dispensation has not helped to build a nation; it has bred a constitutional monstrosity dedicated to notions of super-apartheid—its ultimate achievement a medley of Bantustans

together with a white enclave preserved in its privilege and power. It is also a system that lends itself to corruption and petty tyranny.⁴

In 1985, for instance, the central government employed 16,900 public servants and the second-tier administrations listed 20,400 public servants on its payrolls—plus 251 politicians. That works out to 1 public servant for every 28 Namibians.

Salaries alone cost the central government \$1.9 million annually.⁵ A National Assembly member earns \$800 a month (compared with an average salary of \$150) and Cabinet members are paid \$49,000 a year, raised recently from \$30,000.⁶

The system of separation has bankrupted the national treasury. The second-tier administrations, except for the white regime, cannot meet their costs through local tax revenues. Each one must be funded through the central government, i.e., from subsidies from South Africa. The economic base of the white administration allows it to spend 10 times more on education than the black groups are able to spend. The ratio of pupils to teachers in white schools, for instance, is 18 to 1 compared with 60 to 1 in black schools.⁷

To subsidize the central government, since 1980 South Africa has borrowed (from creditors outside Namibia) between \$375 million and \$500 million (not including funds for the military, which ran in 1983 at roughly \$375 million a year).⁸ In 1986-1987, South Africa contributed \$250 million in direct subsidies to the government in Windhoek. For 1987-1988 and 1988-1989 it reduced the subsidy to \$150 million each year. Thus between fiscal years 1980 and 1990, South Africa will have provided \$2.5 billion (excluding military assistance) to balance the central government's budget.⁹

With the reduction in subsidies, the 1988-1989 budget shows a massive deficit of about \$400 million. The Windhoek administration has borrowed as much as it can. At present it spends nearly \$250 million annually on the separate administrations and about \$300 million annually on the police and the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF).¹⁰

An independent government will be forced to cut the size of the bloated bureaucracy, eliminating the ethnic governments' budgets and reducing the power and resources of the homeland chiefs. (SWAPO leaders have acknowledged the importance of winning the support of the tribal chiefs and have promised to create an Upper House of Chiefs

(Continued on page 239)

⁴David Soggott, *Namibia: The Violent Heritage* (London: Rex Collings, 1986), p. 277.

⁵Wolfgang Werner, "Politics and Economy: Ethnicity and Reformism in Namibia," in Gerhard Totemeyer, Vezzer Kandetu, and Wolfgang Werner, eds., *Namibia in Perspective* (Windhoek: Council of Churches in Namibia, 1987), p. 76.

⁶*The Namibian* (Windhoek), July 1, 1988.

⁷*SWA/Namibia Today*, op. cit.

⁸*SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change*, p. 482.

⁹Interview with Eberhard Hofman, public relations officer in the Administrator General's Office of the Transitional Government, Windhoek, October 31, 1988.

¹⁰Current budget figures are derived from "Namibia's Pre-independence Budget Blues," *The Star* (Johannesburg), November 16, 1988.

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"Substantial obstacles still block the path toward an internal Angolan settlement. Peace is in sight where there seemed to be no hope a year ago, but it remains on a distant horizon."

Peace in Angola?

BY PHYLLIS M. MARTIN

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A generation of young Angolans has grown up in a country at war. There are one million refugees, many packed into urban slums. Sons and brothers are conscripted for active duty in government or guerrilla forces; fatigue-clad soldiers and armored vehicles are a common sight. Tens of thousands—men, women and children—have been maimed by land mines planted in fields and by the roadside. Disease and malnutrition are widespread, and one child in four dies before the age of five. Once prosperous southern settlements are now ghost towns, reduced to rubble. Few of the country's eight million inhabitants have been unaffected by economic dislocation.

The conflict has been in part domestic, but it would never have reached such proportions or endured so long without foreign intervention from four continents, including Africa. The peace accord between three of the five warring forces in Angola, signed in New York in December, 1988, was potentially an event of great significance, and it was greeted with excitement and rejoicing in the Angolan capital. If it holds, the agreement will diminish international involvement in the actual fighting. It may also create a more promising atmosphere for talks between the internal adversaries, the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government in Luanda and UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), the rebel force.

A splintered liberation movement and international intervention on one side or another are part of Angola's colonial legacy. The modern war dates from 1961, when Angolan resentment at Portuguese rule boiled over into an armed liberation struggle. Since the coming to power of the dictator,

António Salazar, in Portugal some 30 years earlier, Angola had been in the grip of fascism. Political freedoms were denied at a time when African nationalists in neighboring countries like the Congo, Zaire and Zambia were winning independence. A secret police force introduced in 1957 rooted out critics of the colonial government and imprisoned the educated and popular leaders or forced them into exile in Europe or in neighboring countries.

Economic grievances affected rural peasants and urban workers alike. In Luanda, where the African population had risen to 155,000 by the late 1950's, there was large-scale unemployment intensified by an influx of poor whites who took up semiskilled and white collar jobs that might otherwise have been filled by African workers. In the most fertile regions, for example in the coffee-growing northern provinces, Portuguese settlers moved to seize African lands and to take advantage of high coffee prices. Peasant producers could get no satisfaction from law courts and became wage laborers on the lands that they had once owned.

Forced contractual labor, which, for example, caused men in the central highlands to leave their families for up to a year in order to work as migrant workers in the coffee-growing north, was another source of discontent. So, too, were demands on villagers, often women and children, to labor on public works projects. In the Kwango and Kwanza basins, forced cotton growing with little or no financial return drew the workforce away from essential food production. Education and social services were largely left to foreign missionaries by the Portuguese authorities. At independence, some 90 percent of all Angolans were illiterate.¹

Between 1961 and independence in 1975, opposition to Portuguese rule consolidated around three liberation movements, each with a regional base.² In Luanda, left-wing intellectuals combined with disaffected urban workers to form the MPLA. White vigilantes and the secret police effectively crushed urban opposition and drove MPLA militants into hideouts in town and countryside and to an external base in Zambia, after Zambia became independent in 1964.

The movement turned to the Warsaw Pact coun-

¹For an overview of Angolan history in the twentieth century and an analysis of the events that led to independence, see W.G. Clarence-Smith, "Capital Accumulation and Class Formation in Angola," and David Birmingham and Terence Ranger, "Settlers and Liberators in the South, 1953-1980," in David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin, eds., *History of Central Africa* (London and New York: Longman, 1983), vol. 2, pp. 163-199 and pp. 336-382.

²For the most comprehensive history of the liberation movements, see John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), 2 vols.

tries for equipment for its guerrilla forces and opened up an eastern war zone. In the north, Congo workers who had led an uprising against conditions on coffee plantations fled to join other refugees in independent Zaire. Kinshasa and frontier districts became the launching grounds for forays into Angola by the forces of the FNLA (the National Front for the Liberation of Angola), which were equipped with covert funds from the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In late 1964, a small breakaway group from the FNLA led by Jonas Savimbi formed a third liberation front, UNITA, in the sandy eastern grasslands bordering Zambia. Savimbi drew his following from his home region in the populated central Angolan highlands and from the refugees in Zambia. UNITA lacked any major source of external support, receiving only a modest supply of weapons from China; thus it remained the weakest of the three movements.

Unlike the other Portuguese territories, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, where there was a single resistance movement, Angolan opposition to colonial power was split three ways as the date of independence approached. An attempt by the Portuguese to patch together a coalition transitional government that would carry the country to independence fell apart. The MPLA, with its traditional power base in Luanda and the hinterland, was able to dominate the capital, but came under attack from the northerners supported by Zairean troops, while by the end of 1975, UNITA and South African forces were advancing from the south.

Faced with this dual threat, the MPLA turned to the Soviet Union for weapons and to Cuba for reinforcements. In November, 1975, its control of the capital brought it to power as the government of independent Angola. Within a year, Angola and the MPLA government had received international recognition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and from the United Nations (UN). The United States, which argues that the MPLA's legitimacy in 1975 depended on Soviet-armed Cuban troops, stands alone among the major world powers in denying recognition to the MPLA government and in refusing to establish diplomatic relations.

As the northern threat was rolled back, Zaire saw its first efforts to win influence in an independent Angola fail. By the late 1970's, without sufficient foreign support, the FNLA had fizzled out and its leaders were in exile. In recent years, the MPLA has offered amnesty to the northerners, many of whom have been reintegrated into the Angolan economy and society. For example, Johnny Pinnock Edwards, formerly the FNLA second-in-com-

mand, is now director of an Angolan oil company. Other individuals have taken seats on the central committee of the MPLA; soldiers have enlisted in the government's army; entrepreneurs with business skills honed in Kinshasa have returned to fill positions vacated by the Portuguese in the private sector. In Luanda, northerners returning from exile in Zaire discovered that state employment was dominated by MPLA supporters, but they have found work as taxi-drivers, tailors, domestic servants, electricians, auto mechanics and traders in the "free" markets. Others moved back into the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire and reclaimed land vacated by Portuguese settlers.³

The international dimension of the Angolan struggle took a new twist in the months immediately after independence when the conflict was integrated into the regional struggle of southern Africa. At the same time, Angola was caught in the web of the global policies of the superpowers.

When the two Portuguese-speaking countries, Mozambique and Angola, became independent, South Africa watched with alarm as its buffer zone against black African nationalism crumbled. Specifically, its worst fears concerning Namibia (which it continued to rule in defiance of a 1966 UN resolution ending its mandate) seemed realized. After independence, Angola allowed SWAPO (the South West Africa People's Organization) to establish bases and supply routes in southern Angola from which to launch raids across the Cunene River frontier into Namibia. The MPLA also allowed the African National Congress (ANC) to maintain camps in Angola. In January, 1989, one report estimated that over 6,000 refugees and guerrillas of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, were based in Angola.⁴

In contrast to its neocolonial relationship with Mozambique, South Africa had less economic leverage in Angola. The colonial Angolan economy had been firmly oriented toward Portugal and Western capitalism in Belgium, Great Britain, West Germany and the United States. Angolan males were not dependent on the South African economy as migrant workers, as was the case in Mozambique. Furthermore, Angola's offshore Cabindan oil reserves were relatively remote from the war in the rest of the country, thus giving Angola a much stronger economy than the weak and dependent Mozambican economy. In its efforts to suppress SWAPO guerrillas and to destabilize Angola, South Africa took up its most viable option, military intervention. UNITA, the most southerly of the forces opposing MPLA and a rebel group without a strong external mentor, became South Africa's ideal ally.

The 1980's saw a general escalation of the

³David Birmingham, "Angola Revisited," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1988), pp. 1-14.

⁴*Africa Confidential*, January 20, 1989.

Angolan war. In August, 1981, the SADF (the South African Defense Force) launched a devastating incursion into southern Angola in search of SWAPO guerrillas. It maintained an active military presence in the country for the next seven years. UNITA (which in 1979 had been at a low ebb, confined to the remote southeastern corner of Angola) received a new infusion of arms and equipment. In the late 1980's, UNITA's ability to wage war against government forces was also enhanced by American military aid. In 1985, the United States Congress repealed the Clark Amendment (1976), which had prohibited military aid to Angola unless it was sanctioned by legislative action. Jonas Savimbi visited Washington in 1986, and was received by American conservatives as a freedom-fighter and a champion against the spread of communism in southern Africa.⁵ Between 1986 and 1988, the United States supplied UNITA with \$15 million in military aid annually.⁶

During this period, Savimbi attracted refugees from the war to his base at Jamba in southeastern Angola, especially those from his home Ovimbundu region and from eastern Angola. The early agricultural policies of the MPLA (which the government has since admitted were ill-conceived) alienated many peasants who thereafter supported Savimbi. The role of farmers, who represent about 80 percent of the workforce, was underestimated by the government in the initial, heavily centralized planning process. Luanda's efforts to promote state farms and cooperatives ran aground in the face of inexperienced bureaucrats, the failure of the government to ensure a supply of basic agricultural equipment and consumer goods to rural areas, a distrust of officials in the distant city (where peasants were very poorly represented in party committees and congresses), and wartime conditions that wrecked transportation between markets in town and country.⁷

Young men with little future were drawn into the UNITA guerrilla army, where the most successful drove trucks from South Africa, carried captured light arms made in the Soviet Union, and learned to operate American hand-held Stinger missiles. Jamba, the "provisional capital," is now "home" to some 12,000 inhabitants. Among them are thousands of Christians and their pastors, refugees from the central highlands where American Church of Christ missionaries worked during the colonial period. Savimbi has skillfully exploited tensions between church and state in Angola, portraying the MPLA as "atheistic and materialistic." Savimbi has persuaded some American churches to direct support for social work toward populations living in and around Jamba.⁸

The intervention by South African forces in the Angolan war and the build-up of American and South African-supplied arms to UNITA was paralleled by an intensification of Soviet and Cuban involvement. The number of Cuban troops in Angola increased from about 20,000 in 1981 to 30,000 in 1985; and from about 37,000 in 1987 to about 50,000 at the time of the peace accord in December, 1988. The Soviet Union has been the main supplier of weapons to the Angolan army. One report estimates that the Soviet Union supplied between \$3 billion and \$5 billion in military supplies between 1985 and 1987.⁹ Thousands of Cubans have worked as civilians in Angola during the past 13 years. The exodus of 90 percent of the 300,000 Portuguese settlers and the low level of educational opportunity for Angolans during the colonial era meant that at independence the country was almost bereft of trained personnel. Cubans have worked as doctors, teachers, engineers, construction workers, fishing and agricultural advisers and public health assistants, and in other skilled jobs.

THE ECONOMY

Almost 14 years of war have had a devastating effect on the Angolan economy. Of export revenue, 50 percent is devoted to defense. The main east-west transportation artery, the 800-mile Benguela Railroad that stretches from the Atlantic port of Lobito to the Zaire border, has been in only partial operation for years due to UNITA mines. The same is true of many bridges and roads. War conditions make it impossible to develop Angola's rich natural resources, like coffee, iron, timber, diamonds and hydroelectric power. Coffee production in 1987 was the lowest in 25 years.¹⁰

Disruption of production equipment, a shortage of raw materials and a fall in investment have contributed to a sharp decline in industrial production, which in 1985 was only 54 percent of the 1973 total.¹¹ A country that could easily feed itself uses

⁵See John A. Marcum, "Angola: Twenty-Five Years of War," *Current History*, vol. 85, no. 511 (May, 1986).

⁶*Independent* (Britain), November 16, 1988; also see N. Brian Winchester, "United States Policy toward Africa," *Current History*, vol. 87, no. 529 (May, 1987), p. 233.

⁷For further discussion of these problems, see Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986) and Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, *Angola in the Front Line* (London: Zed Press, 1983).

⁸"A Freedom Fight Deep in Africa," *Insight*, December 19, 1988, p. 10; Linda Heywood, "American Missionaries and the Rise of Modern Angolan Nationalism, 1950's to the Present," paper presented at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, 1988.

⁹*African Research Bulletin*, December 15, 1987, p. 8687.

¹⁰*The Times* (London), April 4, 1988; *West Africa*, December 26, 1988.

¹¹Report by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, cited in *African Economic Digest*, November 7, 1988.

scarce hard currency to import food for its burgeoning city populations, many of whom are refugees from the war. Ordinary people have learned to adapt and survive in a distorted wartime economy where two parallel markets coexist. Goods are bought at official prices in state stores where the *kwanza* is valued at an official rate. The surplus can then be exchanged on the "free," illegal market for *kwanzas* at 70 times the government price. On the free market, all kinds of produce not available in official stores can be obtained. Some successful entrepreneurs ship their goods to inland markets by air, because road and rail transportation have become difficult.¹²

The exception to the generally gloomy tale of Angola's wartime economy is oil, which overtook coffee as the chief export earner in 1973. In 1988, oil earned about 90 percent of Angola's foreign revenues.¹³ About 70 percent of the oil is produced by Cabinda Gulf, a subsidiary of the American-based Chevron Oil Company, from offshore wells that are guarded by Angolan and Cuban forces. In a strange "marriage of convenience," the United States, which buys two-thirds of the oil, provides the revenues with which the MPLA buys Soviet arms to fight the war against American-supplied guerrillas. About 60 percent of oil revenues go to finance the war and the rest to import the food and other consumer and manufacturing items that allow daily and national life to continue. In contrast to other sectors of the economy, the oil industry is expanding, although this expansion is offset by the fall in world prices. Production has tripled in the last decade, and by 1990 Angola expects to export half a million barrels of oil per day.¹⁴

The year 1988 may receive considerable space in Angolan history books, although it is still too early to assess the impact of events. Militarily and diplomatically, 1988 was the year South Africa withdrew its forces from southern Angola and agreed to independence for Namibia and when the Cubans negotiated the phased withdrawal of their troops. Economically, it was the year when the government outlined a new reform program, and foreign donors and investors showed deep interest in the potential of a peacetime Angolan economy. A large question mark hovered over all future developments, however, because the MPLA government and the UNITA rebels still seemed far from an agreement.

¹²David Birmingham, "Angola Revisted," pp. 3-5; *Guardian* (Britain), May 28, 1988.

¹³*The Times*, March 4, 1988.

¹⁴*The Times*, *ibid*; *Guardian* (USA), November 23, 1988; *Southern African Economist*, October, 1988.

¹⁵*Africa Confidential*, April 1, May 27, July 15, and December 2, 1988; *Independent*, November 16 and December 6, 1988; Victoria Brittain, "Cuba and Southern Africa," *New Left Review*, no. 172 (November/December, 1988), pp. 117-124.

Late in 1987, an Angolan-Cuban attempt to take the UNITA base of Mavinga in southeast Angola failed. Then, early in 1988, an effort by a combined South African-UNITA force to besiege and bring about the capitulation of the government position at nearby Cuito Cuanavale was unsuccessful. The key to MPLA military success in 1988 was an earlier decision to concentrate on the South African threat rather than to chase UNITA guerrillas. This success was achieved by developing the Angolan air force and by bringing in Cuban reinforcements, many of them officers and men who had had previous experience in the Angolan war.

South African forces were strategically outmaneuvered by a contingent of 15,000, which advanced from the coast into a previous no-man's-land along the Namibian border. The Angolans were protected by Soviet-supplied decoy rockets and radar and by MiG-21's, MiG-23's, and Su-22's, flown by Angolan and Cuban pilots. Soviet Sam-8 missile batteries were installed along the border and threatened South African positions in Namibia itself. South Africa's aging Mirage fighters were no match for the Angolans and could no longer protect the SADF operating against SWAPO or against the MPLA-Cuban army in southern Angola.¹⁵

By mid-year, the costs of the Angolan war were no longer acceptable economically or psychologically to South Africa. There was a growing belief that the South African frontier against black nationalism could be defended at the Cunene River as well as at the Orange River. Pretoria decided to withdraw the remainder of its troops, which at the height of the 1988 campaign were reckoned to be about 3,000-6,000 strong.

The August agreement to withdraw the SADF from Angola was part of a more general peace-making process in which South African withdrawal, Namibian independence and Cuban withdrawal were closely linked. From May to December, negotiations continued under the direction of Chester Crocker, the United States assistant secretary of state, who has been given much of the credit for his skills as a mediator. Crocker worked closely with Anatoly Adamishin, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, to reach a settlement in which the superpowers had what Crocker has referred to as a "convergence of interests." The process was in keeping

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"Since its independence, Nigeria has been ruled by the military. . . . However, there is no doubt that the Nigerians, a vibrant, demanding people, have a strong talent for democratic politics and a well-developed demand for . . . political and civil liberties. . . ."

Economic Adjustment and Regime Creation in Nigeria

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SINCE the military overthrew Nigeria's civilian government in December, 1979, successor military governments have struggled to cope with the major consequences of Nigeria's disastrous political economy. The crucial concerns have been three: managing a traumatic, deep recession and undertaking an important structural adjustment in the economy; developing and sustaining political legitimacy among an impoverished public unprepared by political experience to endure harsh authoritarianism; and recreating a more accountable and less corrupt democratic political system than the regime of 1979-1983.

The crises in Nigeria's economy that the military regimes inherited were those of an oil-dependent economy battered first by the softening of the high oil prices in 1981-1982 and then by the collapse of oil prices, in 1986 and after, to \$18 per barrel. In the 1970's and 1980's, Nigeria—the largest sub-Saharan oil producer—came to depend on its oil exports for 90 percent of its export revenue and between 60 percent and 80 percent of its federal and state revenues. Oil exports and the windfall profits from monopolistic world oil pricing drove the Nigerian economy during the 1970's. Average GDP (gross domestic product) growth was 7.5 percent during 1970-1979, propelled by massive increases in government revenues and spending and imports. Average annual growth rates in public (government) consumption during 1970-1979 were 24 percent greater than during 1960-1970; growth rates in gross domestic investment were 141 percent greater, and growth in private consumption was 473 percent greater, figures that indicate the enormity of the spending spree by the Nigerian government and by individuals. The annual average growth in imports was 21 percent during 1970-1979.

Unfortunately, the vast majority of the Nigerian population, rural and urban, did not share in this

bounty. Nigeria was unable to increase life expectancy at birth or to reduce the child mortality rate (ages 1-4) during this period any more rapidly than a neighboring economy, that of Ghana, which passed through the 1970's in prolonged recession.¹ Through royalties, taxes, and part ownership, the state captured the higher oil revenues that flowed from increased output and dramatically higher prices in the 1970's. Popular and especially elite demands on the state and federal governments were so prolific that annual budget deficits varied between 25 percent and 56 percent of the growing revenues, suggesting an inability to contain spending. When expenditures and imports were cut in 1978-1979 because of trade deficits, there were widespread protests, often from the beneficiaries of the oil largesse whose aspirations had been thwarted.

When the enormously inflated oil prices of 1979-1981 faltered in 1981-1982 and then declined, and Nigeria's oil exports plummeted, the civilian government under President Shugu Shagari faced collapsing federal revenues, huge balance of payments deficits and import constraints, despite high external borrowing. This led to large new debt (\$18 billion by 1983) and mounting arrears in repayments. The private sector started to lay off workers at a rapid pace. Tens of thousands of state workers in Nigeria's 19 states went unpaid for three or four months in 1982 and 1983 and launched repeated protests and strikes to extract their wages.

The traumatic decline in foreign exchange earnings from oil—from a high of \$22 billion in 1980 to \$6 billion in 1987 and 1988—and, in consequence, in federal budget receipts, required drastic cuts in imports and government expenditures. The substantial oil glut in world markets, which is estimated to remain at least until the mid-1990's, precludes a renewal of the price of \$30 or more per barrel of oil. This outlook has forced the military government to devise a development strategy markedly different from the strategy followed since 1971.

The second task involves the creation of a civilian

¹Data compiled from World Bank, *World Development Report 1981* (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1981).

democratic regime to succeed the military regime. This poses problems. Many Nigerians became deeply disillusioned by the experience of Nigeria's Second Republic, the democratically elected regime under President Shehu Shagari's National party of Nigeria (NPN), 1979-1983. Constitutional provisions requiring political parties to have broader bases partially muted the severe and violent ethnic conflicts of the First Republic (1960-1966). But ethnic and communal cleavages remained the most powerful bases for mobilizing people in behalf of political claims. Crucial to disillusion was the fact that most leaders of Nigeria's political parties, at national and local levels, were extremely self-serving and amazingly corrupt. Nigeria's governments captured a large proportion of the economic surplus through taxes and royalties. Control of government offices and the allocation of public funds became the sure route to capital accumulation by politicians and aspiring capitalists as well as other groups.

Without egalitarian ideology, the more deeply the Nigerian government became involved in the economy (which it did, extensively exploiting state corporations in the 1970's), the greater the opportunities for extracting this wealth for personal, kin and political purposes. Parties and politicians looked on government offices as sources of private aggrandizement. A culture of corruption was created, and the amassing of private wealth was visible, flagrant and, to some extent, expected. The social dynamics of the culture, especially in southern Nigeria, encouraged greed, and even some of the poor often approved the acquisition of extreme and conspicuous wealth.²

Thus, the idea of political parties seemed to mean corruption and selfishness. After the 1983 coup, several state governors who had been arrested were found to have hundreds of thousands of naira (then, N1 = \$1.47) and foreign exchange in cash in their homes. Jim Nwobodo, the Anambra state governor, was convicted of misappropriating N4.5 million, while Plateau state governor Solomon Lar was convicted of stealing over N30 million in public funds, enough to pay over three-fourths of the arrears in civil servant salaries.³

But the more profound crisis involved the loss of legitimacy of democratic institutions. There was increasing polarization between the northern-based NPN and the three other major parties. There was

a heightening of political violence and thuggery. Ethnic-religious cleavages were mobilized in the 1983 elections. The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) refused to register a powerful opposition alliance for the 1983 ballot; the alliance then broke down. And the 1983 elections involved massive fraud—by several of the parties but mostly by the NPN—that generated an NPN landslide. This was followed by violent popular protests after the gubernatorial elections in the ethnically Yoruba states and elsewhere; a Yoruba governor who lost because of vote fraud was later found by a court to have won by a million votes.⁴ General Ibrahim Babangida later noted that the elections “designed to make leaders more accountable . . . became a nightmare for Nigerians” who were “deliberately disenfranchised.”

BUHARI'S SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

The delegitimation of NPN democracy made General Mohammudu Buhari's December, 1983, coup and the Supreme Military Council (SMC) government widely welcomed. However, some of the SMC's political and economic measures soon undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of many Nigerian groups and classes and, significantly, the officer corps.

The Buhari government won legitimacy with some of its early political measures: the arrests of most federal government leaders, many Congressmen, most of the 19 state governors, and many party leaders; the investigations into corruption; the dismissal of 300 senior civil servants and police; the trials and tough sentences of former political leaders for corruption; and the campaigns to compel greater social discipline—to induce disorderly crowds to queue, to encourage attendance at work, to reduce corruption and theft, and to improve urban sanitation.

Economically, orthodox retrenchment policies were pursued. Tight financial controls were imposed on federal and state spending. Some arrears were paid but at least 50,000 federal workers and state employees were dismissed from the highly bloated bureaucracies. Nigeria sought, unsuccessfully, to reschedule debt arrears and current debt payments. The large portion of export earnings devoted to debt repayment (44 percent in 1985) reduced imports, limited economic growth and made factories idle. The economy had declined sharply in the previous three years; under Buhari it contracted further in 1984 (-5.5 percent growth in GDP) and was flat in 1985. The population suffered, with a 40 percent inflation rate and public and private sector retrenchments. Severe retrenchment was sometimes the only apparent alternative, as in Plateau, where some 30,000 lower-level

²Karin Barber, “Popular Reactions to the Petro-Naira,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 20, no. 3 (1982), pp. 431-450.

³Plateau State: Atukum's Answers,” *West Africa*, October 1, 1984, p. 1986.

⁴See Larry Diamond, “Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism and the Struggle for Democracy,” in Larry Diamond et al., *Democracy in Developing Countries, II: Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), pp. 49-55.

government employees hired between 1981 and 1983 had to be dismissed.

Buhari's SMC quickly alienated many Nigerians by its harsh authoritarianism, its civil liberties violations, and its inability to construct an economic program that offered hope. Under Decree No. 2 on state security, it detained without charge many individuals regarded as threats or dissenters, including prominent journalists, academics and trade unionists. Military tribunals created under Decree No. 3 violated basic ideas of justice, with closed trials, the burden of proof on the accused and no appeals, and were boycotted by the Nigerian Bar Association. Buhari had also given free rein to his second in command, General Tunde Idiagbon, and to the notorious National Security Organization (NSO) established under Decree No. 4 that forbade the publication of "false" information or any information that might bring the government into disrepute. Leading journalists were harassed and arrested. These attacks on Nigeria's lively and critical press showed the regime's contempt for Nigerian opinion-making groups and elicited strong opposition. The government's intolerance of public expressions of dissent was demonstrated by the banning of public political discussions, strikes and medical and national university student organizations when they opposed regime policies. SMC leaders also neglected to heed the dissent of senior officers. Failure to announce a date for renewed democratic rule symbolized Buhari's insensitivity to the need for legitimacy and his distance from "the yearnings and aspirations of the people."⁵

BABANGIDA: CONSTRUCTING LEGITIMACY.

Major General Ibrahim Babangida, Army chief of staff in the SMC, led a quiet bloodless coup on August 27, 1985, which removed Buhari and other senior leaders and created the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). Babangida and his key lieutenants tried immediately to create legitimacy and consent for AFRC rule. Babangida was 44 years old, a demanding, action-oriented, sociable officer who had served in the pre-1979 military government. Babangida and the AFRC set out to create a more open, tolerant government, with a substantial commitment to civil liberties and responsiveness to the public. Decree No. 4 on newspaper censorship was repealed immediately and all detained journalists were freed. To serve "natural justice," Second Republic politicians in detention would have their cases reviewed and would be released if not charged. The powers of the NSO security police were reined in and NSO detention centers were opened to public view. NSO abuses were probed, but the NSO was soon recreated as the State Security

Service. In January, 1986, Babangida announced a date for the return to civilian rule—1990 (later rescheduled, on civilian advice, to 1992)—and the appointed a political bureau of independent-minded civilians to organize a national debate on the transition and the form of the future government. Influential civilians were appointed to the federal Cabinet and to the state cabinets by the new governors.

The AFRC broadened the ethnic-state representation of the AFRC itself to avoid the appearance of ethnic-regional bias (although northern officers dominate senior officer corps ranks); the AFRC also made some effort to diffuse power and to consult those of senior officer rank. This did not stop a plot by senior officers in October-December, 1985, to kill Babangida and key AFRC leaders.

Babangida's government began to throw major questions open for public debate. The immediate question was whether Nigeria should continue negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a \$2.5-billion structural adjustment loan, which meant adopting a strict regimen of austerity and market-oriented policies. With an IMF accord, Nigeria would find it easier to complete stalled negotiations for rescheduling its debts, acquire foreign aid, and finance the imports necessary to jump-start growth.

However, there was powerful nationalist, radical and expedient opposition to an IMF accord, forcefully articulated in the press, on the radio and at public meetings. It was feared that the IMF would require policies that included reduction in oil and other subsidies; devaluation of the naira to raise import costs and stimulate exports; wage freezes and public and private sector layoffs; commercialization, rationalization and, possibly, privatization of unproductive state enterprises; a new emphasis on market mechanisms; and increased incentives for foreign and domestic capital. These measures would sharply reduce living standards, inflate costs and end Nigeria's (illusory) control of its economy. Babangida accepted the opposition and he did not seek an accord with the IMF; debates on the future constitution and foreign policy followed.

As consummate politicians, Babangida and his ministers subsequently offered the harsh 1986 austerity budget, with its structural adjustment program (SAP) as the necessary self-reliant alternative to the IMF loan that had been rejected by the public. The most painful provisions generating new revenue were shown to have specific public benefits: the N900 million raised from a cut in the oil subsidy (which doubled gas and oil prices) was used to rehabilitate the road network; the N500 million from the first-ever state wage-salary cuts (involving higher percentage cuts from higher salaries) would

⁵West Africa, September 2, 1985, p. 1789.

pay for rehabilitating education and health facilities.

Nonetheless, the SAP unleashed between 1986 and 1989 involved choices on strategic social and economic issues, which elicited strong and often insistent opposition from major organized, articulate groups. (Given low oil prices, some severe hardship was inevitable, regardless of the economic policy chosen.) Babangida's AFRC then showed its iron fist—the military's easy capacity to act repressively when challenged by students, civil servants, the press, religious communities, and forgotten prisoners awaiting trial. The regime adopted some economic policies and political practices that were not inevitable and favored productive sectors and their owners in the capitalist economy.

The major purposes of the structural adjustment program (SAP) were to lay the basis for sustained, self-reliant growth; to end high budget and balance of payments deficits, which created unpayable bills and debts; to reduce dependence on imports and oil; and to reduce nonproductive public sector investments and stimulate private sector activity. However, not all the policy measures and the extent to which they were pursued (prodded by the IMF and the World Bank) were necessary.

The first policy measure was the devaluation of the naira, which was important in creating more self-reliant growth and reducing budget and payments deficits. Changing relative prices through devaluation raised the costs of imports and stimulated non-oil exports, because these fetched more in naira. It also increased government revenues. This was crucial, but it did not require the "free market" in naira, which occurred by 1986–1987, so that in effect, the falling world price of oil, by reducing foreign exchange available, drastically reduced the naira's value and, correspondingly, increased import prices, inflation and urban poverty. The AFRC government decontrolled the foreign exchange rate and ended import licensing. A Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) auctioned foreign exchange on a weekly basis to depoliticize devaluation. The naira fell from \$1.20 in 1985 to \$1.05 in January, 1986, and to \$0.21–0.24 during 1988. This led to new production and export of cocoa, palm oil and, especially, rubber.⁶ Moreover, as imported goods became five to six times more expensive, it was hoped that Nigerian entrepreneurs would be stimulated to produce local goods for the market, a less parasitic endeavor than trade.

The second key policy measure has been to increase capital flows and imports to restimulate growth. Loans and aid renewals hinged on both an accord on debt rescheduling on arrears and current debt and an agreement with the IMF on a SAP. While the AFRC government abandoned the idea of an IMF loan, its own SAP policies received IMF assent and a loan from the World Bank. In the long debt rescheduling process, a tentative accord in 1986, leading to \$320 million in private loans and a World Bank commitment, was not made final until late 1988, with a new IMF agreement. This opened up a possible \$2 billion in new loans.⁷ But Nigeria has not yet secured the external financing that it needed. This has frustrated recovery; capital outflows (debt repayments) exceeded capital inflows in 1986–1987. Rescheduling reduced the debt service burden, in 1986 from 46 percent of export earnings to 21.6 percent, in 1987 from 81 percent to 24.3 percent. But total debt has risen swiftly, from about \$18 billion in 1985 to \$26 billion–\$30 billion in 1989.

Ironically, the economy has fallen so far behind that in 1989 Nigeria again ranked among the least developed countries, making it eligible for the World Bank's soft loans (long term, low interest). Nigeria is working to reduce its debt in part through debt-equity swaps, in which dollar debt is exchanged for naira for investment in Nigeria. Nigeria cleared \$70 million in debt in 1988 and seeks to eliminate \$420 million in 1989 and, eventually, \$4.8 billion.⁸

A third policy measure has been to raise revenues and reduce expenditures in order to reduce the high budget deficits that stimulated inflationary demands. New revenues were raised by the federal and the state governments, reestablishing sales, head and development taxes abolished in the days of black gold. Reducing expenditures has meant dismissing workers and freezing wages, in effect a severe wage repression policy, given the inflation.

Subsidies paid to unproductive, money-losing state industries (of which Nigerian Airways is the worst example) and state utilities and services that have not been permitted to pass on rising costs have been a major drain on federal budgets. Reducing subsidies has meant raising costs to consumers, which former governments resisted in order to retain popularity. The Nigerian Electric Power Authority, widely reviled for its endless power failures, was permitted to raise its charges in late 1988 by 400 percent, the first increase since 1979; but the per kilowatt cost of production remained 17–27 percent above the new price. The Nigerian Railway Authority (NRA) has presided over a desperately deteriorating railway system. Previous price hikes and declining government subsidies have been in-

⁶Lindsay Barrett, "Reviving the Rubber Industry," *West Africa*, September 7, 1987, pp. 1736–1737.

⁷*West Africa*, October 19, 1987, p. 2080; January 25, 1988, pp. 116–117; and December 12, 1988, p. 2346.

⁸*West Africa*, February 6, 1989, p. 196.

sufficient to prevent the number of operational locomotives from declining by 1988 to one-fifth the number in 1982, with sharp declines in mileage and passengers. The NRA was overstaffed (with 32,000 workers), but only in late 1988 did the government cut staff by almost 8,000 workers. Still, only new investment will make the railway viable.⁹

Nigerian Airways probably provides the poorest public service. It is desperately in debt (N2 billion in mid-1988), has flown many prestige, low-demand routes, and has had its newest aircraft seized in Great Britain, France, and Denmark for non-payment of bills. Notoriously ineffective, Nigerian Airways was not permitted to increase ticket prices to cover rising costs, because Nigeria's elites objected strenuously. It enraged Nigerians by gross overbooking and the delay of scheduled flights, causing near riots at Heathrow airport (London) and at Ikeja airport in Lagos. In late 1988, at least 2,600 employees, or 36 percent, were sacked and the company's offices were closed in some countries.

More sensitive still are the government's efforts to cut the subsidy on oil prices. Next to food, transport costs are one of the most basic costs of workers. Increased oil prices immediately led to higher fares. The 100 percent increase in oil prices in January, 1986, was accepted, while increases proposed in 1987–1988, at IMF insistence, led to ferocious political battles. The government argued in late 1987 that retail charges involved a subsidy of 68–85 percent of the production cost. Skepticism is permissible. The government apparently wants to raise oil prices to increase domestic revenues, at great cost to the poor. Equally contentious politically has been the move to rationalize surging educational costs. The government has argued that it is more democratic and egalitarian to ensure funding for the Universal Primary Education (UPE) program and that spending 61 percent of federal education appropriations on universities is excessive. It ordered colleges to start reducing the once fully subsidized room and board costs; tuition remains free.¹⁰ Students see this as a way to undermine the historical trend of guaranteeing free higher education for all—a major way to ensure social mobility. In raising revenues and cutting subsidies, questions of social equity are involved.

A fourth policy measure has been to reduce state intervention in the economy in light of the high cost and low effectiveness of this effort and the possibility of corruption. Import licensing was abolished; price controls were reduced sharply; and trade liberalization on imports was decreed (hurting domestic manufacturers). The state agricultural market-

ing boards, monopoly buyers of agricultural crops and sources of state capital accumulation, were abolished. The major objective is the partial or full commercialization or privatization of a wide range of state corporations.

Pragmatists argue this will create greater efficiencies. Nationalists believe that privatization will restore control of the economy to foreign capital. Socialists and radicals see it as a return to more exploitive forms of capital accumulation, inequality, and layoffs; this is, of course, the anticipated outcome. Of more than 100 companies involved, the state hopes to sell about one-half completely; it wants to retain the most strategic corporations and run them on a commercial basis.

The government has also been trying to reattract foreign capital to Nigeria. In January, 1989, it committed itself to reversing key provisions of the indigenization policy to permit foreign capital 100 percent ownership in Nigerian manufacturing and commercial enterprises, 40 percent in key sectors.

Has Nigeria's SAP been successful? Because it has been under way only since 1986, when the SAP was undermined by the fall in oil prices to \$10 per barrel, it is too soon to know. Real GDP growth was down sharply in 1986 (-3.3 percent) because of the oil price plunge; it rose slightly in 1987, 1.2 percent, and accelerated to about 4 percent in 1988, with strong gains in agriculture, industry and mining. However, despite progress in implementing reforms and some revival in local export agriculture and industry, structural changes will come slowly in an economy still dominated by oil.

The AFRC's SAP reforms have undoubtedly altered the economic environment dramatically. But nontraditional exports have not risen greatly; high interest rates have retarded investment. Reforming, commercializing or selling state corporations is just beginning and will be difficult, if indeed buyers can be found. After a year and a half of the SAP, the Babangida government was disappointed, announced the end of the SAP and, in 1988, the government reinflated the economy somewhat, cutting interest rates and permitting a general government wage increase.

The pain from the oil crisis—more than from the SAP itself—has been widespread and has politi-

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Jon Kraus conducts research on West Africa. His most recent articles include contributions to Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl, eds., *When Parties Fail* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), R. Southall, ed., *Labour and Union in Asia and Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1988), and N. Chazan and T. Shaw, eds., *Coping with Africa's Food Crisis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988).

⁹*West Africa*, October 10, 1988, pp. 1879–1880.

¹⁰*West Africa*, September 3, 1984, pp. 1785–1786; and September 28, 1987, pp. 1910–1911.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

INEQUALITY IN AFRICA: POLITICAL ELITES, PROLETARIAT, PEASANTS, AND THE POOR. By *E. Wayne Nafziger*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 203 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$42.50, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

AFRICA IN THE 1990s AND BEYOND: U.S. POLICY OPPORTUNITIES AND CHOICES. Edited by *Robert I. Rotberg*. (Algonac, Mich.: Reference Publications, Inc., 1988. 309 pages, notes and index, \$24.95.)

In this new book on American policy in Africa, Robert I. Rotberg presents 12 papers from a 1987 conference held under the auspices of the World Peace Foundation. The content ranges from general prescriptions for United States attitudes toward the African continent as a whole, to Africa's ethnic conflicts, the debt crisis in sub-Saharan Africa and the potential impact of AIDS in that region. Participants in the conference included Helen Kitchen, John Underwood, Mark Katz and Kenneth Grundy.

Nafziger's study of inequality in Africa posits the proposition that to improve the distribution of income in Africa, it is necessary to tackle the problem of democratizing political participation and economic control. Rejecting World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies that neglect income distribution and call for greater external economic reliance and government involvement, the author believes that political change can lead to a more open and more self-reliant economy.

Debra E. Soled

THE BATTLEFRONTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. By *Colin Legum*. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1988. 480 pages, notes and index, \$49.50.)

Colin Legum, editor of the *African Contemporary Record*, traces the crisis in southern Africa back to its origins in 1948 and analyzes the drift to leftist revolution in his study, *The Battlefronts of Southern Africa*. He blames the apartheid system of South Africa for regional problems, claiming that ending regional violence depends on the resolution of South Africa's own racial conflicts. The outlook is grim: the decay of apartheid will lead to more violence in the short term, and in the long term, the violence may end only by attrition.

Outsiders—Western, Soviet, or Chinese—have had only limited success in influencing

the outcome. But Legum does explain what role outside powers can play, singly and through international organizations. First, the West must acknowledge the destabilizing effect of South Africa's domestic policies on the region as a whole. This detailed work is a highly informative analysis of the complicated dynamics of the situation in southern Africa.

D.E.S.

THE MODERN AFRICAN ELITE OF SOUTH AFRICA. By *Lynette Dreyer*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 186 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$45.00.)

CAN SOUTH AFRICA SURVIVE? FIVE MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT. By *John D. Brewer*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 350 pages, index, \$49.95.)

SOUTH AFRICA: IN TRANSITION TO WHAT? Edited by *Helen Kitchen*. (New York: Praeger, 1988. 216 pages, index, \$35.95.)

SOUTH AFRICA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW. Edited by *Geoffrey Bidman*. (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1988. 159 pages, notes and index, \$37.50.)

A FUTURE SOUTH AFRICA: VISIONS, STRATEGIES, AND REALITIES. Edited by *Peter L. Berger and Bobby Godsell*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 344 pages, appendixes, bibliography and index, \$29.50.)

In these studies of South Africa, all the authors accept the proposition that change is coming to the world's pariah. The speed, ease and direction of that change, and the participants and the consequences they will face form the parameters of their discussions.

Geoffrey Bidman's book on human rights consists of the report by the International Commission of Jurists on how the government's legislation over the years has systematically undermined all human rights of the black and "coloured" population in South Africa, in the name of security. The report's conclusion is not favorable for the future of South Africa's present government.

South Africa's future is the subject of the three anthologies, edited by John D. Brewer, Peter L. Berger and Bobby Godsell, and Helen Kitchen, respectively. Brewer, of The Queen's University of Belfast, and his fellow contributors recognize that South Africa is under tremendous international pressure to change and that internal black revolution threatens the country's stability, but

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NAMIBIA

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should SWAPO come to power.) The new government will have to find ways to accommodate the redundant bureaucrats and displaced politicians or risk the danger that these groups may form antigovernment cliques.

ETHNIC RIVALRIES

In addition to separating blacks into ethnic categories, the various governments in Windhoek have sought other ways to sustain the rivalry among the black groups. In 1980, the central government created the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF), supplemented by a new conscription law requiring all males over 18 years of age to register for service. (Ovambos were excluded because of their close ties to SWAPO.) SWAPO claims that the government was turning a war for liberation into a civil war, pitting brother against brother.

During the transition to independence, SWATF is supposed to be dismantled. Nevertheless, there will be thousands of Namibians who have been trained as soldiers and have been indoctrinated to view SWAPO as the enemy. SWAPO intends to integrate PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia), its military wing, with the former members of SWATF into a unified national army of Namibia. Members of the much-hated Koevoet (Crowbar), a black and white counterinsurgency unit operating mainly in the north, have been accused of committing vicious crimes against the civilian population. They are supposed to merge with the Namibian police force.

SWAPO, too, has been divided structurally by the policies of the government. One of the more curious aspects of Namibian politics is the fact that SWAPO has never been banned. SWAPO members operate legally within the country so long as they do not call for the violent overthrow of the government. As a consequence, SWAPO has an internal and an external wing. SWAPO in exile is headquartered in Luanda, Angola, where its politburo and central committee are led by president Sam Nujoma; the PLAN senior commander is Peter Tsheehama. At home, the national executive is headed by acting president Nathaniel Maxuili and vice president Hendrik Witbooi.

Public meetings of the party were banned in the north in 1979 and in the rest of the country in 1981. In 1986, the courts ordered a relaxation of the ban, and by late 1988 SWAPO was publicizing and holding meetings throughout the country. The

ban on public meetings had forced SWAPO to operate under the auspices of other opposition groups like the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN), women's and students' groups, and trade unions.

Despite all attempts to polarize people on an ethnic basis, the churches, the labor unions, the newspapers and students have brought people together on a nonethnic basis. Since the 1970's, the churches, once in partnership with the establishment, have become integrally involved in the liberation struggle. They operate through the CCN, an umbrella group of various church denominations.

Trade unions have a long history in the resistance movement. The first union was formed in the 1940's, and unions were especially active in the 1950's and 1970's. A super union, the National Union of Namibian Workers (formed in 1977), was revived in 1986 by SWAPO's Windhoek branch. It claims 70,000 members, representing workers in every sector of the country. It includes the National Transport and Allied Workers Union (NATAU), the Mine Workers Union of Namibia (MUN), the Namibian Food and Allied Workers Union (NAFAU), the Namibian Public Workers Union (NAPWU) and the Metal and Allied Namibian Workers Union (MANWU).

The Mine Workers Union, which was organized in 1986, struck the Tsumeb mines in late 1987 to demand better wages and working conditions. The mines held out and eventually the workers capitulated. A national stay-away called by the unions in June, 1988, met with much more support; miners throughout the country joined the stay-away. A month later, Consolidated Diamond Mines recognized the Mine Workers Union of Namibia as a collective bargaining agent.

The student movement is also a national structure for the expression of common goals. NANSO, the Namibian National Student Organizations, grew out of student protest in the north to eliminate the military bases that had been built next to the schools. The students boycotted classes and schools and thousands of young students left Namibia to continue their studies in neighboring countries. In July, 1988, 5,000 students left in one group for Angola.¹¹ In mid-1988, the Namibian government passed the Protection of Fundamental Rights Act, which forbids class boycotts or school or work stay-aways. The punishment for violating the law is 10 years in prison and a \$100,000 fine. Although NANSO grew out of protest in the north, it is an active antigovernment group across the country.

A 1986 study by J.S. Malan of the University of the North in South Africa revealed that the Transi-

¹¹Rajah Munamava, "State Withdraws Charges," *The Namibian*, September 9, 1988.

tional Government of National Unity had failed to win the support of the people in the north. Should free and fair elections be held, it stated, the six parties in the TGNU would win less than 3 percent of the popular vote in Ovamboland. The majority of the people in Ovamboland support SWAPO. Political groups outside Ovamboland also support SWAPO; in October, 1988, Mbanderu chief Munjuku Nguvauva 2d and the Mbanderu Council (Tswana-speakers) voted to support SWAPO should an election be held. Emil Appolus, former SWAPO founder who turned against SWAPO and Resolution 435, has returned to the pro-SWAPO camp as head of the United Nations Peace Action (UNIPA)-435.

Many whites inside Namibia and in South Africa are uncertain about Namibia's economic future. With these fears in mind, in 1988 SWAPO leaders held meetings in Stockholm, Sweden, and Lusaka, Zambia, with members of the white Namibian community. The whites were represented by businessmen, commercial farmers, lawyers, academics, journalists and church leaders. In Lusaka, SWAPO president Sam Nujoma and secretary for foreign affairs Theo Ben Burirab assured whites that SWAPO would not deprive them of their privileges.

SWAPO leaders recommitted SWAPO to peace plan 435 as a whole and further articulated SWAPO policy in the following regard:¹²

- **On land reform:** Land reform will probably not involve large-scale seizures or forced buy-outs of white farms.

The primary targets will probably be the approximately 300 farms owned by absentee landlords who live for the most part in Germany and South Africa. One of the problems facing a new government will be reestablishing the estimated 80,000 Namibians returning from exile and looking for a role in the society.

- **On ANC:** SWAPO will continue to support the African National Congress (ANC) "within the framework of the Organization of African Unity [OAU], the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement"; it will give the ANC diplomatic recognition and allow it administrative facilities, but will not permit bases inside Namibia.

- **On nationalization:** The Namibian Parliament will look toward the nationalization of "one or two enterprises," either in the form of partial govern-

¹²David Niddrie, "SWAPO's Nujoma Speaks: No ANC Bases in Namibia," *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), August 25, 1988.

¹³Interview with Gerhard Totemeyer, professor of public administration and political studies, University of Namibia, Windhoek, October, 1988.

¹⁴"Botha Visits Walvis Bay," *Weekly Mail*, December 9, 1988.

ment shareholding or joint ventures "on the basis of mutual benefit to the country and the corporation."

- **On financial institutions:** A central bank and a Namibian currency will be established.

- **On reconciliation:** SWAPO will adopt a "forgive and forget" policy toward those in government currently described as "Pretoria's puppets."

Whites will be encouraged to stay; but inherent in the Namibianization process some whites will lose their jobs in the government bureaucracy and state-run enterprises. When the Namibian government assumed control over the national rail lines in 1988, about 10 percent of the white employees left the country for South Africa. University of Namibia Professor G. Totemeyer estimates that about one-fourth of the 80,000 whites will probably leave the country. Commercial white farming is dependent on cheap labor and state subsidies, and an independent government will probably not continue current labor practices.¹³

- **On Walvis Bay:** The issue of ownership of Walvis Bay has not been resolved. Walvis Bay became part of the Cape Colony in 1884 and a part of South Africa with union in 1910. Because it is Namibia's only deep-water port, 90 percent of Namibia's mineral exports pass through Walvis Bay. SWAPO has agreed to settle for implementation of 435 without resolving this issue, saying that the status of Walvis Bay will be negotiated after independence. South Africa has made it clear that it has no intention of handing Walvis over to an independent government. In early 1988, the South African military announced an approximately \$15-million expansion and upgrading scheme for its installation at Walvis Bay.¹⁴

The deep-water port is strategically important to South Africa for stationing troops, ships and planes; it will be especially important as a refueling stop for South African airlines if South Africa is not allowed to fly over other African countries. Whoever controls Walvis Bay controls an important stretch of the southwest coast of Africa. Luderitz, another natural harbor on the coast, would require enormous sums of money before it could be useful as an alternative port to Walvis Bay.

As an independent country, Namibia will remain dependent on South Africa for transport, trade and, probably, currency transactions. A positive model for the future Namibia might be Botswana, which enjoys political independence and economic advantages as a member of the South African Rand zone. A less positive model is Lesotho, which has economic advantages because of its relations with South Africa but has almost no political independence.

Independent Namibia's relations with South Africa will be crucial, especially if SWAPO wins a

majority. The prospects that an antigovernment group, like the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or RENAMO), will be supported by elements in Namibia, South Africa or Germany are real. The new government will have to consolidate its support from various ethnic groups if it wants to avoid the kind of disruptions caused by tribal rivalry that occurred in Zimbabwe. The economic dislocation and tribal separation fostered by South Africa's long occupation of the country will be slow to disappear. A firm financial commitment to the new government by the international community will ease the transition. ■

GHANA AND BURKINA FASO

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The regime took several actions to promote self-reliance and cultural authenticity: for example, banning fruit imports, changing the country's name from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso (*burkina* means noble, upright; *faso* means an organized community—a nation—that upholds integrity, nobility and uprightness),⁸ and replacing the words "law," "decree," and "order," with the local terms, *zatu*, *kiti*, and *rabo* respectively. The expulsion of the United States Peace Corps in 1986 may well be explained in these terms.

In terms of social engineering, the Sankara regime tried to overturn traditional patriarchy and to elevate the status of women. In the latter regard, Sankara's commitment to transformationalist objectives was apparent. Women were appointed to high political and administrative offices; female ministers were given responsibility for the ministries of finance, health, environment and tourism, culture and family development, and national solidarity; women were appointed to head Burkina Faso's diplomatic missions in Ghana, Mali and West Germany. In addition, the government campaigned against polygamy and prostitution. It also instituted a policy under which a portion of a man's income would be deducted at the source and given to his wife as household income—a measure designed to discourage irresponsible men from dissipating their monthly incomes to the detriment of family welfare.

Sankara's economic policies could best be described as eclectic improvisation. He ordered the building of 90 popular shops, the construction of dams and health clinics, the establishment of collective farming ventures on which civil servants were drafted to work periodically, and the replacement of a textile factory with small craft units using hand looms. The regime put most of these

measures into effect without undertaking feasibility studies, and they were implemented without adequate technical advice and supervision.

A populist dimension was evident, moreover, in the regime's decisions to stop taxing peasants and to order the construction of schools, dispensaries and movie houses in villages (but without the necessary support for their effective operation). Slum dwellings in the heart of the capital city were razed; new plots of land and financial compensation were promised to the former owners. The failure to deliver on this promise in a reasonable period of time led to widespread misgivings on the part of the people who had lost their homes.

RECONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY

In 1983, Ghana encountered a grave fiscal crisis, exacerbated by such factors as the drought, bush fires, food shortages and the return of a million Ghanaians from Nigeria. It became increasingly apparent to Rawlings and some of his entourage that populist structures and processes could not prevent chaos in political, economic and social life. Consequently, Ghana's leaders shifted from radical populism, altering structures of government, recruiting moderate personnel, and adopting conservative economic policies, in part to avert state collapse.⁹

Signs of this shift became evident by the middle of 1983. Rawlings presided over the purging of the militant members from the June Fourth Movement and the National Defense Committee (NDC). Radical populists like Chris Atim, Sergeant Aloga Akata Pore and others disengaged or resigned from these organs; some even fled the country. In December, 1984, the NDC and the PDC's and WDC's were abolished, replaced by Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR's). These new institutions were shorn of ideological and political roles but received additional economic support and mobilizational functions. The CDR's lacked the autonomy of the PDC's and WDC's; they were subject to the authority of the new CDR National Secretariat headed by Colonel H. Y. Assassie. In addition, they were assigned mainly economic roles. The Rawlings regime also dissolved the Interim Management Committees, replacing them with Joint Consultative Committees with only advisory functions. Thereafter, state corporations were headed by professional managers and technocrats who were charged with the responsibility of restoring efficiency and profitability.

Simultaneously, the Rawlings regime began an all-out war against what it described as populist "nonsense" and excesses. It publicly condemned violence and acts of intimidation by revolutionary

⁸Quoted in Martin, op. cit., p. 84.

⁹The authors are indebted to Naomi Chazan for this observation.

cadres as "infantile leftism" and instituted severe measures against offenders, including individuals regarded as personal allies or friends of Rawlings. Thus Joachim Amartey Kwei, a prominent leader of the revolution and a PNDC member, was executed after his conviction for participating in the 1982 kidnapping and murder of three judges and an army officer.

By 1983, there were signs that the PNDC was inclined to adopt the conventional World Bank-IMF (International Monetary Fund) formula of economic austerity and increasing reliance on market mechanisms. The regime dropped its opposition to currency devaluation, and after October, 1983, it subjected the cedi to a series of very substantial devaluations (practically eliminating the black market in currency exchanges by 1988). It initiated a program of retrenchment in the country's oversized bureaucratic establishment, lifted price controls on most manufactured and imported goods, allowed the people's shops to disappear, reduced consumer subsidies, and introduced consumer fees for health and educational services.

Starting in late 1982, there was growing evidence of more conciliatory PNDC attitudes toward the middle class and the values and interests it represented. Subsequently, in his August, 1983, address to the nation, Rawlings announced plans to review some of the convictions imposed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (over which Rawlings had presided in 1979) and the PNDC courts in his second administration. The arbitrariness of some of these convictions had been very damaging to middle class interests. A sub-committee of NIC was set up to review such cases and their findings. As a result some individuals who had fled the country were cleared.

The process of reconciliation could also be seen in the regime's decision to appoint a chief, the Naandom Na, Polkuu Konkoo Chiri 4th, to the PNDC (replaced, after his death, by Alhaji Idrissu Mahama). Also reassuring to the middle class was the appointment of Justice D.F. Anan to the PNDC and to the chairmanship of the National Commission for Democracy, the body charged with responsibility for working out a constitution and an eventual return to civilian rule. In addition, old-guard politicians like J.F. Tandoh and F.A. Jantuah were named as secretaries of state. Steps were taken, moreover, to include a variety of establishment figures in the Regional Consultative Councils that had been formed to advise the regime on economic and political matters.

Nevertheless, under the PNDC regime

populism is alive and well, particularly at the rhetorical level. Rawlings continues to urge popular participation, people's power and administrative decentralization, even while top-down decisions are made and popular forces (for example, NUGS and the Trade Union Congress and individuals in the June Fourth Movement, the New Democratic Movement and the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards) are being repressed. Its vigilantes (the Civil Defense Organization, the CDR's, and so forth) are still regarded as populist agencies, as are the Public Tribunals, which continue to mete out "revolutionary" justice. At the international level, the regime still maintains a revolutionary and leftist posture, identifying itself symbolically with Libya and other populist regimes.

In Burkina Faso, the precise nature of the "U-turn" is less clear. There have been significant differences between the Ghanaian and the Burkinabé experiences. In Burkina Faso, there is some evidence of a greater emphasis on agrarian and rural transformation, as exemplified by the slashing of rural taxes, the establishment of farming collectives and the attempt to provide rural health, educational and other social services. Throughout his tenure (August, 1983-October, 1987), Sankara waged a frontal assault on the country's powerful trade unions.

In Ghana, by contrast, urban concerns like rent, price and transport fare controls dominated the populist agenda. Initially, Ghana's farmers were asked to accept lower prices for their food crops and for cash crops like cocoa, and the calls for rural self-reliance amounted to little more than exhortation.¹⁰ PNDC forbearance toward the unions lasted longer; the government attacked the union establishments from within, using rank and file militants for this purpose. Rawlings's actions against the unions were calculated to rid the union leadership of "establishment" figures (who were highly suspicious of the Workers' Defense Committees and other militant organizations) and to replace them with more populist-oriented persons. In Ghana antiworker measures like retrenchment policies, the withdrawal of subsidies and the ending of price controls were not put into effect until mid-1983.

Sankara emerged as the dominant populist figure in Burkina Faso during his tenure as head of state; but in Ghana there was a somewhat wider diversity of powerful figures, although Jerry Rawlings always remained most prominent. Thus, in Ghana, militant supporters of the regime initiated actions of their own without official approval: witness the abortive attempt to abolish the traditional courts.

¹⁰See James C. W. Ahiakpor, "The Success and Failure of Dependency Theory: The Experience of Ghana," *International Organization*, vol. 39, no. 3 (Summer, 1985), p. 545.

But perhaps the major difference between the two populist regimes lay in the relative ease with which PNDC authorities decided on and engineered a "U-turn." For the most part, Sankara persisted with his populist revolution, in both his rhetorical and his substantive commitments. Certainly, there were indications of a reconsideration. For example, Sankara displayed some ambivalence during the Voltelec takeover incident, warning the public against "precipitate actions." Conciliation toward establishment elements could be seen in Sankara's decision to set up a National Union of Burkinabé Elders whose prominent members included the country's first two heads of state—Maurice Yameogo and General Sangoule Lamizana. Another sign of pragmatism was Sankara's acceptance of a substantial loan from President Eyadema of Togo and financial assistance from the Ivory Coast's President Félix Houphouët-Boigny to build an airstrip at Pô. Some observers have concluded that there was a link between this financial assistance and a perceptible moderation of Sankara's criticism of these regimes as neocolonial lackeys.

How can one explain the relative differences between these populist regimes? Certainly, the contrast between the two economies is clear; this inevitably has significant implications for the opportunities open to political leaders. Burkina Faso's economy is less developed than Ghana's, with fewer links to the international economy. Moreover, Burkina Faso did not hit a decisive low point, as Ghana did in 1983 (with the drought, famine, bush fires and other problems). Such incidents had a powerful impact on the thinking of the PNDC leadership, forcing it to reconsider the limits of populist change sooner than this became necessary in Burkina Faso.

Ghana also had a broader base of regime opponents. Its middle class, professionals and technocrats were able to regroup and to challenge the populist forces. But even in Burkina Faso, with its less dramatic economic downturn, the sustained mobilization of the masses had to be tempered over time by Compaore and his colleagues, in what they euphemistically refer to as a "rectification process." There is a certain ambiguity about the implications of "rectification." The Compaore regime claims that it "is aimed at consolidating the democratic and popular revolution"; "rectification" can also be viewed as a turn to the right.¹¹

CONCLUSION

Clearly, populism in Ghana and Burkina Faso was a common response to similar situations of

¹¹*The Popular Front Action Program* (Ouagadougou, 1988) (mimeograph).

economic marginalization and political and social decay. It united and mobilized a large number of people, giving them hope that collectively they could cope with their desperate conditions. In both countries, urban workers gained reductions in rents and access to consumer goods at controlled prices. In Burkina Faso, the Sankara regime made extensive efforts to extend social amenities to the rural areas, to enable women to play leading roles at the political center, and to reduce the influence of traditional authorities in political life. In both countries, the black market came to have a less broad-ranging and ominous impact, and the urban working class and lumpenproletariat gained a larger role in national and community decision making.

The populist revolutions in Ghana and Burkina Faso were also similar in their disappointments and the resentments they provoked. Despite their promises of change and improvement, these regimes often aggravated distribution problems and housing scarcities. Their attacks on the mercantile and professional classes led to capital and technological flights abroad, deepening the problems of capital investment and economic growth. The assertiveness of workers on the factory floors had built-in antiproductionist implications that, in time, made it most difficult to give a sense of direction to the revolutionary forces.

At the international level, West African populism created as many problems as it resolved. The constant anti-imperialist speeches and revolutionary posturing were not looked on benignly by foreign donors, who responded by reducing their bilateral (and sometimes multilateral) aid. The rash termination of the United States Peace Corps program in Burkina Faso may have been well received among urban-based militants, but it led to disappointments in the villages where it set back efforts at social development. However, if the populist commitment complicated relations with certain Western donors, it strengthened populist regimes in their negotiations with multinational companies (most notably, the renegotiation of Ghana's Volta River project) and in their efforts to establish alliances with other radically inclined states.

In brief, populist experiments involved temporary gains both at the domestic and the international levels, but at severe costs. In the political sphere, revolutionary zeal and anarchic tendencies threatened regime stability in both countries. The kidnap and murder of three Ghanaian judges and an army officer proved to be a watershed event in that country, causing deep resentment in the ranks of the middle class and leading to a reassessment of regime goals and tactics. Populist zealots apparent-

ly acted without calculating the consequences and, contrary to their intentions, the effect was to speed up a "Thermidorean reaction."

Perhaps the greatest costs of these populist initiatives were in the area of economic development, where temporary mobilizational gains were offset by productivity-inhibiting tendencies. For example, the severe shortages in food and other consumer items that plagued Ghana in 1983 were attributable in no small part to the populist decision to sell consumer goods at less than market prices. The heavy rains that followed provide a partial explanation of the plentiful food supply of the post-1983 period; another partial explanation includes the farmers' reactions to the bitter experiences of 1983, the lifting of price controls on food (providing an incentive to produce), and improvements made in the transportation system. The razing of markets and dwellings in Burkina Faso during Sankara's rule also had a negative effect on living conditions.

It is possible that the antiorganizational element in Sankara's populism and the political and economic costs that it entailed helped to prepare the ground for the attack that killed him on October 15, 1987.¹² On the other hand, the PNDC decision to change direction caused the regime to lose credibility among its original supporters, creating a legitimacy crisis that still limits the PNDC's ability to mobilize support for its programs. In any event, populism and the "Thermidorean reaction" that followed in Ghana and Burkina Faso represent stark political choices under very rigid constraints. ■

¹²Popular Front, *Memorandum on the Events of October 15, 1987* (Ouagadougou: March, 1988), p. 10.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

(Continued from page 216)

economy, reducing demand and employment even in the informal sector.

The adverse consequences of reform programs are immediate, whereas significant benefits from the programs typically take years or even decades to appear and spread. Governments, aid donors and humanitarian groups have rightly voiced growing concern in recent years about easing the social costs of adjustment for the poor. But the politically more significant groups adversely affected by reforms are the urban middle classes, particularly those bureaucrats whose real incomes have plummeted or who have been fired with little chance of alternative employment.

African governments are just beginning to confront these problems. The government of Ghana, for example, has undertaken a modest program, called the Program of Actions to Mitigate the Social

Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), aimed at easing the impact of adjustment on the poor through expanded public services and public works. Because personnel costs are a major component in many PAMSCAD projects, it also promises to provide additional employment for unemployed bureaucrats. While aid donors have been quick to contribute to PAMSCAD, the program remains small and largely symbolic.

Another challenge to the political sustainability of economic restructuring programs goes to the basic nature of many political systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Governments have relied on urban elites as their principal sources of support. The rural masses—mostly small farmers—have rarely held significant political influence. Influential planters in the Ivory Coast and powerful farmers in Kenya are rare exceptions. Political support from elite groups has typically been secured by means of various kinds of patronage—through government employment, government contracts, subsidies, protection from foreign competition, special access to foreign exchange and import licenses, and a host of other arrangements.

Economic restructuring programs aim to shift incomes from urban consumers to rural producers, and from the powerful to the powerless. And the reforms, by reducing the role of the state in the economy, also shrink a government's ability to use patronage to maintain a support coalition. That African governments have not already experienced greater internal political instability is probably a reflection of the newness of many reform programs. As these reform programs increase in scope and duration, governments may be forced to become more repressive in confronting domestic discontent or to seek support among the farmers who have been the major beneficiaries of the reform programs thus far.

Finally, by becoming so deeply involved in economic restructuring in sub-Saharan Africa, the IFI's, particularly the World Bank, have staked their own reputation and a significant proportion of their resources on the success of reforms. There is already a tendency in the world press to hold these institutions responsible not only for economic but also for political conditions in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The IFI's have indeed taken on a considerable responsibility for Africa's economic and political future. But they do not have the power—or even at times the knowledge—to determine that future. The IMF and the World Bank publicly abjure any interest in influencing the political processes in African countries. And their African members would resist any overt efforts on their part to do so. Yet Africa's economic future will be determined as much by politics as by economics. ■

THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

(Continued from page 212)

Washington and Pretoria are estranged partners, deeply divided over apartheid while linked to a regional peace process that may bring the most far-reaching transformation in southern Africa since the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in 1975.

NEW PERSPECTIVES

Southern Africa could be a major testing ground for the Bush administration, particularly testing its ability to forge a bipartisan foreign policy that has congressional support. In addition to the considerations mentioned above, the domestic political agenda will also enter into play in this arena. Since the election of George Bush, Republicans have declared their intention of seeking to capture the black vote; yet Democrats, who have elected a black American, Ronald Brown, as party chairman, are dedicated to holding onto their most loyal voting bloc. In the contest for black votes, both parties must demonstrate sensitivity to African issues, particularly to South Africa. Blacks had an unprecedented impact on shaping United States policy toward South Africa during the Reagan years. George Bush, who raised expectations early on by meeting with prominent black political leaders, must take into account the implications of civil rights activist Jesse Jackson's call that 12 percent of the American population should identify itself as African-American.

The concern with bipartisanship and the quest for black support may set a new direction in United States policy in southern Africa. But President Bush is also keen to avoid alienating the right, which has targeted the region as an area of concern and which drives policy in an opposite direction. The central question for the United States at this juncture, therefore, is whether a genuine political consensus can be achieved, taking these domestic and international factors into account, or whether political polarization will lead to paralysis.

American public opinion will be an important factor in shaping future policy, although it has rarely been significant in the past. Active American diplomacy in southern Africa started in 1976, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger embarked on last-minute shuttle diplomacy during the administration of President Gerald Ford to achieve a settlement of the conflicts in Rhodesia and Namibia. The shuttle diplomacy continued through the administration of President Jimmy Carter, which succeeded in forging a multilateral initiative, known as the Contact Group (consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and

Canada), which negotiated the United Nations plan for Namibian independence that is the basis for the current accord.

Public opinion did not play a strong role in either of these periods, however. Even the first term of the Reagan administration conformed to the pattern. Chester Crocker worked in relatively obscurity, without much public scrutiny and with virtually a free hand from the administration. Not until 1984, when an uprising in South Africa propelled apartheid into the mainstream of public attention, did "constructive engagement," Reagan's southern Africa policy, come under fire.

The second term of the Reagan administration brought new perspectives to United States policy in southern Africa in more ways than one. The public outcry over repression in South Africa and the failure of the United States to respond appropriately resulted in an overwhelming vote of no confidence in the administration's policy and a decisive refutation of the premises on which the policy was based. It took some time for this to register, and the trappings of the administration's policy remained in place. Crocker, for example, continued to oppose sanctions, to stress the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal to Namibian independence, and to insist that the United States would stay "engaged." Nor was there a sharp turn in the United States approach to South Africa, where the fundamental tenets of the policy remained largely intact.

But gradually a new flexibility in regional diplomacy appeared. Ultimately, Crocker repudiated his own policy, not by bowing to public opinion (which he continued to reject), but by reacting to changing regional events. Step by step, he acted in ways that overturned many of his own propositions, as geostrategic shifts, a change in the military balance in the region and mounting economic pressures opened up a window of opportunity.

Whereas previously Crocker had spurned multilateral diplomacy, in the last year of the Reagan administration he pursued it with a vengeance. Instead of shutting Cuba out, he came to see that it had to be included as an integral part of the negotiating process. Building on the improvement in East-West relations, Crocker enlisted Soviet support instead of portraying it as a common enemy of Washington and Pretoria. The linkage formula was repackaged, so that South Africa would free Namibia before, not after, all the Cuban troops left Angola, as the United States and South Africa had insisted on for years.

Most important, Crocker distanced the United States from South Africa's strategic interests, in direct contradiction to his original call to identify with white fears in order to influence Pretoria. Crocker made no protest when Cuba sent between

10,000 and 15,000 fresh troops to reinforce Angolan forces threatened by a South African counteroffensive that was launched in 1987 and extended into 1988. Nor did he encourage bankers, allies or international institutions to help bail out Pretoria from the economic squeeze imposed by sanctions, debt, disinvestment and the falling price of gold. Pressed from all sides, including its own domestic supporters as the death of white conscripts began to provoke protest from the white electorate, South Africa finally agreed to cut a deal.

New perspectives were also introduced during the later Reagan years with regard to the tools and tactics of United States policy. Before Ronald Reagan, diplomacy and aid to the black-ruled states in the region were the primary threads of involvement. During the Reagan years a wider array of measures was adopted, even though they occasionally worked at cross-purposes and were not all part of official policy. Diplomacy intensified, superpower relations were brought to bear on the conflicts and economics assumed a larger role in exerting pressure. A substantial United States aid program to antiapartheid groups was introduced, bypassing the South African government.

Congress became deeply involved, voting not only for a comprehensive new approach to South Africa that included sanctions but for resuming military assistance to UNITA after a lapse of nine years. Even though some of these measures, like sanctions and disinvestment, appeared to distance the United States from the region, they were, in fact, attempts to exert more influence. Moreover, American institutions, from universities to religious groups, began searching for ways to promote development and erode apartheid in South Africa, including "black empowerment," a term that included support for programs for black education, labor unions and community institutions. These developments may offer fresh opportunities for applying pressure and incentives once considered unacceptable.

REGIONAL TRENDS

Whatever the domestic and international trends, the character of United States policy will be defined, to a large extent, by developments in the region, for internal events set both the limits and the opportunities for effective external influence. Three major trends in the last decade are noteworthy.

First, violence reached unprecedented levels in the 1980's, with massacres, cross-border attacks and insurgencies. The accord in southwestern Africa holds out the promise that violence will diminish as the foreign armies withdraw. But many states in the region are still affected by internal armed rebellions that are either linked to or were started by South

Africa. Many of these rebellions have spilled over into neighboring countries or have economic consequences for the region as a whole. Within South Africa, violence has become endemic, with a simmering revolt that intermittently erupts into popular uprisings, regularly crushed with ever-increasing force by the government.

A second regional trend is the political escalation of local conflicts. In the 1970's, for example, a settlement in Namibia would have required only the consent of South Africa and SWAPO (Southwest Africa People's Organization), the liberation movement that fought for independence. Today, the accord that promises to grant independence to Namibia depends on the cooperation of the Angolan, Cuban, Soviet and American governments, as well as the South African government; SWAPO was not even present at the talks. The insurgency in Mozambique has also drawn in every neighboring state.

A third trend is the worsening crisis in South Africa. Blacks and whites are reassessing their strategies in light of the political stalemate. Antiapartheid leaders seem increasingly aware that, with the overwhelming power of the state and the removal of ANC bases from the neighboring frontline states, the struggle for racial equality will likely continue for some time and will end, not in violent upheaval or a revolutionary overthrow of the government, but at the negotiating table. Whites are in more disarray than they have ever been since the ruling National party came to power in 1948, and the government is in transition. General elections promise a new generation of party leaders and possibly a new political alignment at the top. Meanwhile, larger socioeconomic forces, like urbanization and population growth, are tearing at the walls of apartheid, and international pressures on Pretoria are mounting.

Without a major breakthrough, the prospect is for an accelerating spiral of economic attrition, political violence and racial conflict. On the other hand, uncertainties and confusions within South Africa could also offer the international community a chance to exert a margin of influence on the conflict that was not available before. ■

ANGOLA

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with the new Soviet-American détente, which has favored resolving regional issues through negotiation. The Soviet Union was eager to reduce its deliveries of military equipment estimated by the United States State Department at between \$1 billion and \$1.5 billion in 1988.¹⁶ Moscow was able to bring pressure to bear on the MPLA and Cuba to

¹⁶*The New York Times*, January 11, 1989.

adopt a more flexible position, especially with regard to Cuban troop withdrawal. The United States was eager to reduce the Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola and to normalize Angolan-United States relations.¹⁷

In the final agreement concluded in Brazzaville and signed in New York in December, 1988, South Africa agreed to a gradual withdrawal of its forces from Namibia, to be concluded by November 1, 1989. A UN team of observers will supervise the transition process leading to independence according to the 1978 UN Security Council Resolution 435. The 22-year war between South Africa and the SWAPO liberation forces, a war that for the last 14 years spilled over into Angola, will come to an end. In a related agreement between Luanda and Havana, a schedule was worked out for a UN-verified, gradual withdrawal of 50,000 Cubans from Angola. The first 3,000 Cubans left in January, 1989. By November 1, 1989, 25,000 Cubans will have left Angola, and the remaining forces are to be pulled back north of the Benguela Railroad. The remaining 25,000 are to withdraw by July, 1991.

From the Angolan government's viewpoint, the overriding factor leading to the agreement is Angola's desperate need to restore its war-torn economy to a degree of normalcy, to convert economic wealth from potential to reality, and to invest national resources not in war but in alleviating the suffering of ordinary people. In December, 1987, President José Eduardo Dos Santos took over the portfolio of minister of state for economic and social affairs and declared 1988 as the "First Year of Economic Cleansing." A full-scale program of reform (known by its Portuguese acronym, SEF) includes economic decentralization, reduction of the budget deficit, liberalization of price controls, devaluation of the *kwanza*, incentives for peasant producers, an increased role for the private sector and cooperative ventures between private entrepreneurs and the government. In an interview in November, 1988, Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem, the minister for petroleum and production, acknowledged that the state sector had been allowed to grow beyond the government's capacity to manage it.¹⁸

According to laws passed by the National Assembly, in 1989 the government will focus on economic recovery; beginning in 1990, a five-year plan will

emphasize the development of infrastructure; and in 1995, economic development will begin. Reports suggest, however, that very little progress had been made in implementing the new plan by the beginning of 1989. Its implementation has run into problems associated with a lack of experienced personnel, as well as ideological and bureaucratic problems. Overshadowing every difficulty is the government's continuing conflict with UNITA.

Hovering in the wings are foreign investors and donors anxious to take advantage of Angola's great potential for economic development, if peacetime conditions were to prevail. A team from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) visited Luanda in November, 1988, and World Bank experts have made a study of the economy under the auspices of the UN Development Program. Angola has been seeking membership in the IMF in order to reschedule its debts and to gain greater access to external credit, but its attempts have been blocked by the United States.¹⁹ Other governments have taken action, however. Portugal's foreign minister started lobbying for a "Marshall Plan" for Angola at the end of 1988, just before the peace accord was signed. Discussions have begun between Lisbon and Luanda on a 10-year reconstruction plan that is based on increased foreign investment. A consortium of Western banks has lent Angola \$120 million to develop the Takula oil fields off Cabinda. The European Commission moved rapidly after the signing of the accord, with a \$100-million grant to resettle refugees, develop rural infrastructure and create jobs.²⁰ IMF experts are predicting that the Angolan economy will recover quickly when the war ends.

The major unknown factor in Angola's immediate future is the relationship between the MPLA and UNITA, a factor that was not included in the peace negotiations during 1988. Two aspects of the situation must be considered. One is UNITA's military capability and its ability to wage the guerrilla war without South African aid. In February, 1989, Savimbi claimed that he had stockpiled sufficient weapons from South Africa to continue the war for two years and had enough fuel for motorized vehicles for one year. He claimed that even afterward, when the Cubans have withdrawn according to the Brazzaville Accord, UNITA will continue to be a formidable enemy, able to continue a low-level offensive.²¹ President Ronald Reagan's administration made it clear that the United States would continue to supply arms to UNITA as long as the Soviet Union supported the Angolan army. It is likely that the administration of President George Bush will do likewise. A top-level UNITA spokesman visited Washington, D.C., in February, 1989, and talked with officials of the Bush administration about increased aid to compensate for the loss of the

¹⁷For a detailed analysis of the peace process, see Colin Legum, "Southern Africa: Analysis of the Peace Process," *Third World Reports*, January 11, 1989.

¹⁸Radio Luanda, December 14, 1987, reported in *African Research Bulletin*, January 15, 1988, p. 8722.

¹⁹*Guardian*, November 23, 1988.

²⁰*Guardian* (USA), November 23, 1988; *Financial Times*, December 24, 1988; *West Africa*, December 26, 1988.

²¹*Washington Post*, February 15, 1989.

\$80 million that was received annually from South Africa.²²

Even if military aid through Namibia is cut off, UNITA says that a new airfield to receive long-range aircraft has been built at Jamba. Furthermore, in the first half of 1988, UNITA opened up a new base at Quimbele in northern Angola, which can be supplied through the Zairean port of Matadi or from Kamina, an air base used by the United States in southern Zaire. In June, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Savimbi visited Washington, D.C., in order, it is believed, to discuss opening UNITA's northern front.

The MPLA-Cuban forces could claim victory in the southern Angolan war in 1988; but they were unable to stop intensifying guerrilla attacks in central and northern Angola. These included bombing in Huambo, Angola's second city, cutting off the Luanda electricity supply for several hours, and destroying much of the remaining rolling stock of the Benguela Railroad. Guerrilla attacks continued in the early months of 1989.²³

A second factor influencing future developments is the lack of unity within UNITA. In the past year, opposition to Savimbi has grown, partly because of his highly personalized style of leadership. He is reported to rely increasingly on family members for security and has appointed friends to top positions. Opposition has come from a war-weary younger generation and from exiles in Europe and the United States. Rank-and-file members from the Huambo region have seen family members maimed and killed by UNITA bombs. Dissidents, some of them leaders who have criticized Savimbi, are reported to have been detained or have "disappeared," most recently, Tito Chinjungi, who was previously UNITA's foreign minister and its representative in Washington.²⁴

In spite of the ongoing conflict, both the MPLA and UNITA have indicated a willingness to negotiate. Savimbi has referred to the December peace accord as a "golden opportunity" for national reconciliation. President dos Santos has called for a cease-fire, and the MPLA government introduced an amnesty for UNITA supporters in early February, 1989.²⁵ Savimbi is not included in this offer because he is held responsible for collaborating with the Portuguese in the late colonial period and for the South African alliance.

Savimbi's future is a major stumbling block to

²²*Washington Post*, February 10, 1989.

²³*Africa Confidential*, April 1, May 27, July 1, and July 15, 1988; *Guardian* (USA), November 14, 1988; *West Africa*, January 23, 1989; National Public Radio, February 10, 1989.

²⁴*Africa Confidential*, August 12, 1988; *Africa News*, February 6, 1989.

²⁵*The New York Times*, January 27, 1989; *Washington Post*, February 15, 1989.

any agreement, because he is unacceptable to the MPLA and is still unlikely to accept exile after more than 20 years of war. It is also unlikely that many UNITA supporters will defect under the amnesty offer. Substantial obstacles still block the path toward an internal Angolan settlement. Peace is in sight where there seemed to be no hope a year ago, but it remains on a distant horizon. ■

SOUTH AFRICA

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and, at the same time, would attempt limited reforms like the proposed black National Council. For most blacks this is a far cry from the demands for one-person, one-vote in a unitary state. In such a polarized political environment, changes of white leadership have minimal impact for blacks.

South Africa's next President will have to face pressing domestic, economic and political issues. Sanctions have had less effect than the toll of apartheid policies on South Africa's weak economy. There is increasing unemployment, particularly among blacks, and this may worsen if the price of gold falls any further. Internationally, South Africa will continue to face a hostile environment with increasing demands for sanctions and pressures for disinvestment.

Under the constitution, a general election will have to be called in March, 1990, unless an agreement is reached with Reverend Allan Hendrickse. There was a 1987 election for the white House of Assembly and P.W. Botha hoped to avoid another election at a time when Andries Treurnicht's Conservative party was gaining strength in parliamentary by-elections and in municipal elections. Hendrickse's support is necessary for a constitutional amendment to delay the election, but he insists that he will back down only if the government repeals the Group Areas Act. If so, Botha's successor will face the dilemma of reaching a compromise agreement or holding an election at what might not be an opportune moment. Repeal of the Group Areas Act will alienate not only the conservatives but also the large number of whites who cling to residential segregation. A national election might lead to the embarrassment of further victories for the extreme right and hence to constraints on the extent of reforms.

Tragically, in South Africa, authentic black leaders remain alienated from the political system, and there will be renewed efforts to co-opt blacks who do not necessarily represent the sentiments of the majority. The next President will be installed with pomp and circumstance, while Nelson Mandela will continue to languish under house arrest near Cape Town. For the foreseeable future, there will be more of the same in South Africa. ■

NIGERIA

(Continued from page 237)

cized many issues and social conflicts. The merchant-professional-managerial class has benefited most from the oil bonanza. Those who have benefited least, urban and rural workers, have paid the heaviest price for the decline of oil prices and the SAP.¹¹ Price decontrol, wage freezes, massive dismissals and inflation have shifted income from impoverished wage-salary workers to producers and merchants.

TRADE UNION AND STUDENT PROTESTS

The Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC), composed of 42 industrial unions, has been engaged in continuous conflict with the Buhari and Babangida governments over their solutions to Nigeria's economic crisis. The huge retrenchments somewhat reduced worker and union militancy, because most private sector unions had been unable to stop the dismissals.¹² In 1985, however, the NLC opposed wage-salary cuts; real wages were already depressed and the NLC believed that workers should not subsidize leadership mismanagement. In 1986, when police killed demonstrating students at Ahmadou Bello University in Zaria, the NLC (familiar with police repression) sided with the students and planned a nationwide demonstration. AFRC said this was a "direct challenge" to its "authority and legitimacy."¹³ So a token demonstration in Lagos led to massive arrests of union leaders.

Ali Chiroma, NLC president, rallied the union movement around opposition to retrenchment, privatization and reductions in the oil subsidy. The government effort to end the national minimum wage for all firms with less than 500 workers, a situation that applied to 80 percent of Nigeria's workers, was an attempt to depress real wages even further and was opposed successfully by the NLC in 1987. In late 1987, the NLC also successfully opposed a new effort to raise oil prices, mounting demonstrations in 19 states. Then, in February, 1988, when the NLC was badly divided at its quadrennial labor congress and split into two factions,

the AFRC government seized the opportunity to dissolve the NLC for six months, to dismiss all NLC leaders, and to turn its affairs over to a sole administrator for reorganization. Shortly thereafter oil prices were raised slightly; and striking students at the University of Jos were killed by police. For two weeks, the trade unions went on strike against the oil hikes and the ban of the NLC in states all over Nigeria.¹⁴ The government closed most universities and then banned strikes and demonstrations, the NLC and the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS).

The Babangida government's inattentiveness to worker grievances and complacency about massive dismissals while the economy regressed and prices rose have reduced the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of many workers and unions. In addition, in 1986-1988, university students engaged in a wide range of protests against the degrading material conditions of life, the government threat to end payment for room and board and the oil price issue. The high incidence of crime in the 1980's is also explained in part by high unemployment and social despair.

CREATING A DEMOCRACY

During 1986, the Political Bureau appointed by President Babangida organized a wide-ranging debate on the future of the Nigerian government. It submitted its report to the AFRC, which in July, 1987, published a white paper that laid out key constitutional features and a timetable for a return to civilian rule. The agenda for political reform is as follows: for 1987, the establishment of a National Electoral Commission (NEC) to organize and monitor elections and of Constitutional Review Committee, and the holding of nonparty local elections; for 1988, the creation of an independent Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal to investigate corruption and the election of the Constituent Assembly; for 1989, the promulgation of the new constitution, the lifting of the ban on party politics (limited NEC recognition and registration of only two parties) and the holding of party-based local elections; for 1990, elections for state legislatures and governors; for 1991, the taking of a national census, a politically contentious matter that will arise while the military is still in office; and for 1992, elections for the federal legislature and the office of President.

The AFRC government had instructed the Political Bureau to start with the 1979 constitution in making its recommendations. It offered some changes. The AFRC itself then laid down basic guidelines within which debate and change could occur: a presidential executive with a federal system; a federal legislature with two chambers (reflecting the number of states and population),

¹¹Yasuf Bangura, "The Recession and Workers' Struggles in the Vehicle Assembly Plants: Steyr-Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy*, September, 1987, pp. 4-12; Sayre Schatz, "Pirate Capitalism and the Inert Economy of Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1984), pp. 45-57.

¹²Terisa Turner, "Petroleum Recession and the Internationalization of Class Struggle in Nigeria," *Labour, Class and Society*, vol. 18, no. 1 (April, 1985), pp. 31-34.

¹³*West Africa*, August 18, 1986, p. 1719.

¹⁴*Newswatch* (Lagos), May 16, 1988, pp. 12-18; *West Africa*, February 22, 1988, pp. 308-309; March 14, 1988, pp. 449-450; and May 2, 1988, p. 772.

state legislatures with one chamber; legislators as part-time officials, without salaries (reducing the possibility of people of modest means holding office); and, a key provision, the allowance of only two political parties.

Parties could not demonstrate a religious, ethnic or regional quality and had to be broadly based. Permitting only two parties will require the creation of broad coalitions between regional-ethnic leaders and groups, creating two centrist-conservative parties. A two-party system favors stability over change and has one virtue: it prevents a three-party system. However, leaders are already seeking to mobilize voters along state lines, and religious cleavages in Nigeria have recently become politicized. The AFRC later removed a contentious issue by decreeing that there would be two new states (making 21) and that the constitution would forbid the formation of other states.

Neither the Constitutional Review Committee nor the large Constituent Assembly changed the draft constitution appreciably. The Constituent Assembly extended the President's one term from five to six years, rejected constitutional guarantees of press freedom and Senate confirmation of ministers (thus weakening accountability), decreed the death penalty for any future coup leader, and became acrimoniously embroiled in a Muslim-Christian dispute over whether Sharia legal appeals should be included in the constitution. Babangida eventually banned future discussion and left appeals on Sharia law in the constitution.

By February, 1989, the transition process was proceeding well. The first local government elections in December, 1987, had been marred by "irregularities" in many areas. Some elections were voided and reheld in 1988. The AFRC had banned from public office for life all politicians or civil servants who had been found guilty of abusing public office. Those who held public or political-party office in the First or Second Republics and had not been convicted of an offense were banned until after the 1992 elections. Disputes on eligibility are being settled by the NEC, which also will select the two parties from among those seeking registration and will conduct elections (the NEC's predecessor was easily corrupted). A major problem likely to arise is conflict between newly elected officials and high-level military leaders. In 1988-1989, the AFRC was taking strong measures to disrupt the early organization of political associations before the legalization of parties.

A primary consideration in the long delay before returning to civilian rule concerns the SAP and the renewal of economic growth. There are no guarantees that conditions will greatly improve by the time state and national elections are held in 1990-1992.

Since its independence, Nigeria has been ruled by the military. The current round of military rule, 1983-1992, has been only moderately more repressive and inequitable than the last period of civilian rule; its inequity flows from its economic policies and market orientations. However, there is no doubt that the Nigerians, a vibrant, demanding people, have a strong talent for democratic politics and a well-developed demand for the political and civil liberties that flourish under democratic, not military, rule. Unfortunately, the class structure has not encouraged an equivalent devotion to equality, but the populism of democratic politics in Nigeria creates greater impulses for equality than does military rule. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 238)

they are not optimistic that change is any closer now than 10 years ago.

The contributors to Kitchen's collection are more firmly convinced that change has come to South Africa and will accelerate, though they are not sure of the outcome. They see South Africa in a state of transition. The outcome, they agree, will be determined by internal factors, with only limited influence from outside pressure. Contributors include Robert Rotberg, Zwelakhe Sisulu, John Marcum and Stanley Uys.

In Berger and Godsell's book, American and South African scholars evaluate political strategies for all the major actors concerned in South Africa. The contributors believe that apartheid should be replaced by a democratic system and that the cost of the transition to the economy and to the population should be minimized. John Marcum, Helen Kitchen, Michael Spicer and Heribert Adam are among the contributors.

Finally, Lynette Dreyer has published a book based on her doctoral research at the University of Stellenbosch, concerning that small group of black South Africans who have risen to the top of the social hierarchy in spite of apartheid. She profiles 60 leaders in business, religion, community life and the professions from a social perspective. When the changeover to black leadership in South Africa does occur, this group will be at the forefront. D.E.S.

KWAME NKRUMAH: THE POLITICAL KINGDOM IN THE THIRD WORLD. By David Rooney. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. 293 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$29.95.)

The first post-colonial black ruler in Africa, Kwame Nkrumah led Ghana to independence
(Continued on page 256)

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of March, 1989, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arms Control

March 6—Before the opening of the East-West conference on March 9, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposes a broad 3-stage reduction for conventional weapons and troops in Europe; U.S. Secretary of State James Baker 3d calls the Soviet proposals "impractical."

March 9—The East-West conference opens in Vienna.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

March 9—In Kuala Lumpur, an ASEAN conference on Indochinese refugees (held under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) concludes with proposals to curtail the flow of boat people; these proposals will be refined at an international conference on refugees planned for June, 1989.

March 12—Vietnamese refugees seeking asylum will no longer be accepted for resettlement automatically as of March 14, according to a joint statement by ASEAN members. Instead, a screening process will be used to separate "economic migrants" from political refugees.

Central American Peace Plan

(See *Intl, UN; Nicaragua; U.S., Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

Environment

March 2—In Brussels, the European Community (EC) agrees to eliminate the use of chemicals (chiefly chlorofluorocarbons) harmful to the planet's ozone layer by the year 2000.

March 7—123 nations end a 3-day conference in London on reducing the production and use of chemicals harmful to the planet's ozone layer; they agree to phase out the use of these chemicals by the year 2000; 20 nations immediately sign an agreement to reduce harmful chemical production and use at least 50 percent by 2000.

European Community (EC)

(See also *Intl, Environment, Intl Terrorism*)

March 20—EC members allow their diplomatic envoys to return to Iran; however, the ban on high-level contact between EC members and Iranian diplomats will remain in force.

International Terrorism

March 14—Under a "long arm" statute, a U.S. district court jury in Washington, D.C., convicts Lebanese terrorist Fawaz Yunis for his 1985 involvement in the hijacking of a Jordanian airliner with 2 Americans on board.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

March 16—The 46-member OIC rejects the death sentence against author Salman Rushdie decreed by Iran's leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

(See also *Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 22—After meeting with U.S. officials in Tunis, the PLO rejects a resolution calling for an end to the uprising in Israel's occupied territories.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Intl, ASEAN; Lebanon; Sudan*)

March 23—In Basel, 100 countries adopt a treaty to prevent the further exportation of hazardous waste materials without proper safeguards. The treaty is signed at once by 34 nations.

March 31—The foreign ministers of 5 Central American countries end a 2-day meeting and ask the UN to provide an unarmed observer force to patrol the area to prevent violation of the peace accord for the area.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *India*)

March 8—The Afghan resistance claims that it has begun the siege of the city of Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan.

March 13—The Islamic party, a faction in the Afghan resistance, announces that it will not return Stinger missiles to the U.S.; the U.S. wants to buy back the missiles to prevent arms dealers and terrorist groups from obtaining them.

The government begins using Soviet-made Scud-B missiles against the rebel forces laying siege to Jalalabad.

March 15—Reports from Kabul indicate that the Soviet Union has begun an airlift of military supplies to Jalalabad.

March 23—Government officials claim that the main bridge on the road between Kabul and Jalalabad has been destroyed by Afghan rebel forces.

BAHAMAS

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

BANGLADESH

March 1—Parliament approves legislation that will establish three local government councils to administer the Chittagong Hill Tracts, hoping to end a little-known 20-year-old tribal conflict.

BOLIVIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

BRAZIL

(See *Japan*)

BURMA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 2—A draft election law is published for the first multi-party general election since the late 1950's. The elections are to take place within 14 months.

CAMBODIA

(See also *Vietnam*)

March 17—After meeting with U.S. President George Bush on March 13, Prince Norodom Ranariddh (the son of Prince Norodom Sihanouk) says that the U.S. President promised him "full support" during the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

CHILE

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 14—The government blames Chile's Communist party for tampering with a Chilean fruit shipment to the U.S.

CHINA(See also *Japan; Nepal; Taiwan*)

- March 5—The New China News Agency reports that 1 policeman and 10 protesters were killed when Chinese police fired on Tibetan rioters in Lhasa.
- March 8—China imposes martial law in Tibet and Chinese troops surround Lhasa after 3 days of rioting; according to official Chinese accounts, 16 people have been killed in the worst incident in Tibet since China took control of that country in 1959.
- March 10—In India, the Dalai Lama appeals to China's de facto leader, Deng Xiaoping, to lift martial law in Lhasa.
- March 19—The foreign affairs committee of the National People's Congress terms a U.S. Senate resolution criticizing the violence in Tibet "gross interference" in China's domestic affairs.
- March 20—In the keynote speech at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress (NPC), Prime Minister Li Peng calls for more central planning, in sharp contrast to his speech at last year's meeting.
- March 21—In separate speeches at the NPC, Deputy Prime Minister Yao Yilin and Finance Minister Wang Bingqian announce new restrictions on collective and private enterprises. A 10 percent tax will be levied on these enterprises and on the economic activities of military units and local governments; companies that produce inferior goods will be closed by the government.
- March 27—In a news conference, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen calls for a "new pattern" in Sino-U.S. relations; he also criticizes U.S. congressmen who have made an issue of China's handling of Tibet, family planning, and human rights.
- March 29—Customs officials seize a petition calling for the amnesty of political prisoners—in particular, Wei Jingsheng, who has been imprisoned for 10 years. The petition was signed by 24,000 individuals from 34 countries; a copy was also sent to Beijing by facsimile.
- March 31—Officials in Tibet say that over 300 people have been detained since the March 8 declaration of martial law.

COLOMBIA(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- March 18—The Colombian government and the leftist M-19 guerrilla faction sign an agreement to begin peace talks on April 1.

EL SALVADOR

- March 1—Leftist rebels reject the cease-fire declared by the army on February 28; the rebels label the truce a "publicity maneuver."
- March 12—The military admits that its soldiers killed 10 unarmed civilians in the small village of San Francisco in September, 1988, and says that 2 officers will be prosecuted for the killing.
- March 17—On the eve of the March 19 presidential election, poll workers resign after receiving death threats from leftist guerrillas; the rebels cut off power and water in most of the country.
- March 18—Bombings are reported in San Salvador; leftist rebels try to shut down all transportation on the eve of the presidential election.
- March 19—Widespread violence is reported during presidential voting; at least 10 people are killed.
- March 20—Alfredo Christiani, the candidate of the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena) party, is declared the winner of the presidential election. Christiani received a majority; he will replace centrist President José Napoleón Duarte on June 1.

GREECE

- March 17—Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou appoints 12 Cabinet ministers; the 54-member Cabinet offered its resignation March 16. Papandreou's popularity has declined because of a political scandal involving fugitive banker George Koskotas.
- March 23—Ionnis Mantzouranis, former secretary general of the Cabinet, admits handling millions of dollars in bribes from George Koskotas intended as payoffs for government officials.

HONDURAS(See *Nicaragua; U.S., Foreign Policy*)**INDIA**

- March 1—For the first time in the 1980's, India announces a reduction in its military budget to \$8.7 billion, representing 14 percent of total outlays, down from 17 percent last year. India's military is the fourth largest in the world.
- March 3—Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi announces that he will remove some restrictions on the Punjab state and release most of the Sikhs who have been in jail since 1984. The detainees have been held without trial since the 1984 raid on the Golden Temple in Amritsar.
- India's Supreme Court refuses to reverse the settlement of the Bhopal disaster case between the Indian government and Union Carbide, in spite of popular protest. More than 3,000 Indians died as a result of the pesticide leak in 1984.
- March 6—India agrees to provide humanitarian and technical aid to Afghanistan.
- March 27—The judicial report on the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is released to Parliament. The report, which has been suppressed since 1986 for reasons of national security, implicates one of Gandhi's closest aides and criticizes the security forces charged with protecting her.

IRAN(See also *Intl, EC, OIC; Japan*)

- March 8—Iran severs its diplomatic ties with Great Britain, accusing the British government of defending the author of *The Satanic Verses*, Salman Rushdie, a British citizen.
- March 28—Teheran radio announces the resignation of Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri as the legally designated successor to religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

IRAQ(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**IRELAND**(See *Lebanon*)**ISRAEL**(See also *Intl, PLO; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- March 1—The final results of the February 28 round of municipal elections are released. The Likud party has scored a decisive victory and has gained control of 7 major cities previously controlled by the Labor party.
- March 18—Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin blames Jordan for the March 17 death of an Israeli soldier at the hands of Arab guerrillas. The guerrillas attacked the soldier and slipped back into Jordan; the Jordanian government says that it has the guerrillas in custody.
- March 20—Israeli news services disclose the recent findings of an intelligence report given to the Cabinet; the report concluded that the uprising in the occupied territories would not abate and that negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli government would be necessary to end the crisis.
- The Israeli Air Force bombs the main base of the Popular

Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command, in Lebanon; at least 20 people are killed.

March 30—In an interview, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir announces he will propose elections in the occupied territories if the Palestinian uprising ends; Shamir says he will discuss these elections and other Israeli peace proposals with U.S. President George Bush in April.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 1—Following similar actions taken by Western countries, Japan plans to cut its purchase of Iranian oil to 200,000 barrels a day, a reduction of one-third. The cutback is to begin in April, 1989.

Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone cancels a trip to the U.S. after he is implicated in the Recruit Cosmos stock scandal. He has denied personal involvement, but has acknowledged that his staff purchased shares in Recruit.

March 3—Ambassador Nobuo Matsunaga informs U.S. Senator Robert W. Kasten (R., Wisc.) that Japan will not finance the construction of a 500-mile highway through the Amazon rain forest in Brazil. The \$300-million project, known as BR-364, is opposed by environmentalists who fear it will harm the rain forest.

March 4—A nationwide poll shows that Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's approval rating has fallen to 21 percent, the lowest since his election.

March 6—Prime Minister Takeshita says Japan committed "aggression by militarism" in World War II; 2 weeks ago, he suggested that historians should determine whether Japan was the aggressor. His original comments elicited intense criticism in China, the Soviet Union and South Korea.

March 8—Parliament (Diet) opposition members demand the subpoena of former Prime Minister Nakasone because of his involvement in the Recruit scandal.

Four days after leaving Vietnam, Vietnamese refugees in an overloaded fishing boat collide with a Japanese tanker, the *Nissei Maru*, in the South China Sea. 130 are believed dead; 35 were rescued by the tanker.

March 27—Japanese officials express irritation over U.S. President Bush's attempts to revise the agreement to help Japan develop the advanced F-16.

Hisashi Shinto, the former chairman of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT), is indicted on bribery charges in connection with the Recruit scandal.

March 28—The Tokyo Broadcasting System announces it has signed a contract with the Soviet Union to send a journalist on a Soyuz rocket to the *Mir* space station in 1991.

March 30—Speaking before Parliament, Prime Minister Takeshita offers an apology to North Korea for "great suffering" caused by Japan during its 36-year rule of the Korean Peninsula, which ended in 1945; Takeshita also calls for a "direct dialogue" with North Korea.

JORDAN

(See *Intl, Intl Terrorism; Israel*)

KOREA, NORTH

(See *Japan*)

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *Japan*)

March 3—The Ministry of Foreign Trade reports that because of slow export growth, South Korea's trade surplus fell to \$110 million in January-February, 1989, down from \$772 million in 1988. Exports for the same period rose only 8.1 percent; imports rose 18 percent.

March 20—To avoid political violence, President Roh Tae

Woo indefinitely postpones a referendum on his performance in office. This referendum was Roh's key campaign promise.

March 21—The *Wall Street Journal* reports that South Korean joint ventures of more than \$1 million with Communist countries will be more tightly controlled, and some will require government approval. South Korea has 8 contracts with Communist countries worth more than \$1 million.

March 22—President Roh orders a new crackdown on leftist opposition forces. Chief of Police Cho Jong Suk announces that police may use deadly force against violent attacks by rioters.

March 29—In a broad military reorganization, President Roh dismisses 2 high-ranking generals who criticized his handling of the opposition.

LAOS

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 6—The Laotian government postpones a joint search for the bodies of American MIA's (soldiers missing in action in the Vietnam War) because of a dispute over a U.S. State Department report on Laos's role in drug trafficking.

March 16—The Laotian government agrees to conduct a joint search with the U.S. for the bodies of 547 American MIA's.

March 27—The first national elections since the Communists took power 13 years ago are held. The voters will choose the new 79-member legislature.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Intl Terrorism; Israel*)

March 14—Christian and Muslim forces and Syrian soldiers battle in and around Beirut. According to Lebanese police, at least 40 people have been killed in the fighting.

March 21—A land mine kills 3 Irish soldiers from the UN peacekeeping force stationed in southern Lebanon.

LIBYA

(See *Sudan*)

MEXICO

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

MONGOLIA

March 3—Reductions in the armed forces of up to 50 percent in manpower and motor-rifle divisions are announced.

NEPAL

March 25—After trade and transit treaties expire, India closes 11 of the 13 main routes to Nepal. Treaty negotiations are at an impasse; India is also reportedly concerned about Nepal's growing ties with China.

NICARAGUA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 10—The government announces the pardon of 1,800 former members of the Nicaraguan National Guard. The pardon is the most recent step taken by Nicaragua to comply with the Central American peace plan.

March 15—In a conciliatory move toward the Roman Catholic Church, President Daniel Ortega Saavedra permits broadcasts by a Catholic radio station in Nicaragua.

March 24—Nicaragua condemns the new U.S. plan to provide humanitarian aid to contra forces living in Honduras.

PARAGUAY

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

PERU

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

POLAND

March 2—Lech Walesa, leader of the Solidarity labor union, meets with Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak in Warsaw to resolve the stalled negotiations between Solidarity and the government.

March 7—Government spokesman Jerzy Urban accuses the Soviet Union of murdering 4,000 Polish army officers in the Katyn Forest in 1943. Responsibility for the massacre has been a point of contention between Poland and the Soviet Union since World War II.

March 9—The government and Solidarity reach a tentative accord on free, open elections for the Senate. (the upper chamber of Parliament that was deactivated in 1946) and on more open representation in the current 460-member Parliament. In exchange for this concession, the legal powers of the President are to be enhanced.

SINGAPORE

(See *Taiwan*)

SOUTH AFRICA

March 2—President P.W. Botha, who is recovering from a stroke, says that he will resume his presidential duties at the end of March; when he became ill, Botha resigned his position as party leader and allowed Constitutional Development and Planning Minister Christiaan Heunis to be appointed Acting President.

March 10—The Dutch Reformed Church, the major Afrikaner church in South Africa, condemns apartheid for the 1st time. The church, which claims that 80 percent of South African government legislators are members, says that it "unequivocally regards apartheid in all its forms as a sin."

March 12—In his 1st interview since his stroke, President P.W. Botha says he will not resign as President.

March 13—The National party's 130 legislators draft a resolution asking party leader F.W. de Klerk to replace P.W. Botha as President.

March 15—The Dutch Reformed Church changes its public stance on apartheid, saying that the justification of apartheid is a "scriptural error," not "heretical," as the church claimed on March 10. Anti-apartheid, black church and mixed-race church leaders are highly critical of today's action.

March 22—A compromise between President P.W. Botha and National party leader F.W. de Klerk is reportedly reached at a Cabinet meeting; the South African Broadcasting Corporation says that Botha will remain President until parliamentary elections are held later this year.

March 29—The government orders hunger strikers to be treated in prison hospitals; South Africa has been plagued by the escape of prisoners from public hospitals to foreign embassies, where the prisoners have sought asylum.

SRI LANKA

March 3—President Ranasinghe Premadasa names acting Foreign Minister Dingiri Wijetunge as Prime Minister to prevent other contenders from challenging his position as President. The Prime Minister's tenure has been reduced to one year as part of Premadasa's plan to reduce the Prime Minister's power.

SUDAN

March 5—Prime Minister Sadiq Mahdi claims that the military will support his new coalition government. In February, the military ordered Mahdi to end the 6-year civil war with the rebels in southern Sudan.

March 8—Mahdi returns from a 1-day visit to Libya; the military objects to Mahdi's ties with Libya, claiming that the relationship has isolated Sudan from moderate Arab nations.

March 23—UN officials say that in April rebels and Sudanese government officials will allow international food relief to be supplied to famine-stricken southern Sudan.

March 25—The Supreme Council names a new Cabinet, to replace the Cabinet that resigned on March 12.

SYRIA

(See *Lebanon*)

TAIWAN

March 6—President Lee Teng-hui arrives in Singapore for a 3-day visit, the first official overseas trip by a Taiwanese head of state in almost 12 years. Lee says that state visits from Taiwanese officials will still be possible even after Singapore officially recognizes mainland China.

March 27—The Central Bank announces it will relax foreign exchange controls.

TURKEY

March 27—Returns from the March 26 local elections show that Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's Motherland party finished 3d in the balloting; however, Ozal vows to wait until 1992 to call national elections.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Arms Control; Afghanistan; Japan; Poland; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 8—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin announces that the Soviet Union will accept the arbitration of the International Court of Justice with regard to agreements on genocide, trafficking in prostitution and slavery, women's political rights, racism and torture.

March 14—In the Estonian capital of Tallinn, 50,000 ethnic Russians and non-Estonians protest the "creeping counter-revolution" of Estonian nationalism, accusing the Estonians of "undermining socialism."

March 15—At a Communist party meeting on food problems, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev introduces his "new agrarian policy," including dismantling the state agricultural bureaucracy and instituting a system of cooperative banks and stock markets, an agricultural free market, and lifelong land tenancy.

March 16—President Gorbachev's new farm policy is endorsed by the Communist party Central Committee.

March 19—In Moscow's Gorky Park, thousands of demonstrators protest the alleged harassment of Boris Yeltsin, the former Communist party leader of Moscow, who is campaigning for a seat in the Congress of People's Deputies.

March 27—Results from the March 26 election for the Congress of Deputies, the most open election in the history of the Soviet Union, are released. Boris Yeltsin defeats the local Communist party candidate, receiving 89 percent of the vote. Other proreform candidates defeat prominent party and government leaders in what is seen as a popular rebuke of Communist party conservatives.

March 30—The executive committee of the World Psychiatric Association votes provisionally to readmit the Soviet Union to its organization; the readmission of the Soviet Union, subject to the approval of the entire organization in October, is opposed by human rights groups and psychiatric associations.

UNITED KINGDOM**Great Britain**

(See also *Iran*)

March 15—The findings of a 5-year inquiry into the 1982 deaths of 6 suspected IRA (Irish Republican Army) members are released; although 18 officers receive reprimands, no individual will be prosecuted for murder.

UNITED STATES

Administration

- March 10—President George Bush nominates Representative Richard B. Cheney (R., Wyo.) as secretary of defense.
- March 15—President Bush sends Congress his child-care tax credit proposal for low-income families; under the formula, families with incomes of less than \$13,000 per year would receive up to \$1,000 in tax credits for each child under the age of 4.
- March 25—President Bush selects William H. Taft 4th as ambassador to NATO.

Economy

- March 3—The Commerce Department says that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.6 percent in January.
- March 10—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate declined to 5.1 percent in February, the lowest rate in almost 15 years.
- March 15—The Commerce Department announces that in January the nation's foreign trade deficit was \$9.5 billion.
- March 17—The Labor Department says that its producer price index rose 1.0 percent in February.
- March 21—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.4 percent in February.
- March 23—The Commerce Department says that the nation's gross national product (GNP) grew at an annual rate of 2.4 percent in the last quarter of 1988.
- March 29—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators fell by 0.3 percent in February.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Arms Control, Intl Terrorism, PLO; Afghanistan; Cambodia; Chile; China; Japan; Laos; Nicaragua; Vietnam*)

- March 1—The State Department reports that worldwide production of drugs showed a sharp increase in 1988; the department says political instability and economic depression contributed to the problem in many of the 3d world drug-producing countries.
- As required by law, Secretary of State James Baker 3d certifies to Congress that Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, the Bahamas and Paraguay need to "do more" to reduce drug trafficking but are nonetheless certified to continue to receive U.S. benefits; Laos and Burma are de-certified.
- March 3—The State Department and the Soviet Union agree to increase the number of diplomatic staff members each will maintain in the other's country.
- March 8—The State Department grants entry visas to 3 PLO members to attend a conference on Middle East peace negotiations at Columbia University. The U.S. does not usually grant visas to PLO members.
- March 10—Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady proposes that the leading industrialized democracies should help 3d world countries to reduce their debts and their interest payments.
- March 13—Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt meets in Honduras with Honduran President José Azcona Hoyo and asks him to allow the Nicaraguan contras to remain in Honduras for another year; last month, 5 Central American Presidents agreed to call for the disarming of the contras and their removal from Honduras.
- Secretary of State James Baker tells Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens that the U.S. believes a 2-tiered approach to Middle East problems is the way to achieve peace in that area.
- March 14—Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy William Bennett announces an administration decision to ban the import of semi-automatic assault rifles temporarily, effective at once.
- The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) orders the re-

moval from sale of tons of grapes and other fresh fruit from Chile because 2 grapes have been found to contain cyanide. The U.S. embassy in Santiago received anonymous telephone calls March 2 and March 9, warning that Chilean fruit shipped to the U.S. had been poisoned.

- March 15—The U.S. State Department announces that tighter restrictions will be placed on technology transfers to Japan, as part of an agreement to build an advanced version of the F-16 fighter. The Commerce Department sought restrictions, fearing foreign competition resulting from technology transfer; the Defense Department opposed restrictions.
- March 17—The FDA rescinds its ban on Chilean fruit; the ban will be lifted over the next 5 to 9 days.
- March 24—Iraq agrees to pay \$27.3 million in indemnities to the families of U.S. military personnel killed in Iraq's mistaken attack on the U.S.S. *Stark* in 1987.

Labor and Industry

- March 2—Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulators take control of 37 insolvent savings and loan institutions in 6 states.
- March 3—President Bush refuses to declare an emergency 60-day cooling-off period in the strike of Eastern Airlines machinists; the strike is set for midnight tonight.
- March 4—Pilots, flight attendants, and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers strike Eastern Airlines and halt 90 percent of its operations.
- March 6—In Los Angeles, U.S. District Court Judge Consuelo Marshall fines Rockwell International Corporation \$5.5 million for defrauding the U.S. Air Force of \$446,000 on a navigation satellite contract.
- March 9—Eastern Airlines files for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 to conserve its cash.

The FDIC takes control of 45 more insolvent savings institutions, with assets totaling \$13.6 billion.

- March 29—The Exxon Shipping Company acknowledges that it has failed to contain the 240,000 barrels of oil that leaked into Prince William Sound from the *Valdez* supertanker; the tanker hit a reef on March 24 and the spill endangers a large portion of the Alaskan fishing industry.

Federal regulators take over 20 insolvent Texas banks owned by MCorp of Dallas.

- March 31—Two more money-losing savings and loan institutions are taken over by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the FDIC; the California-based banks have combined assets of \$15.1 billion.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) begins an investigation for possible criminal liability in the Alaskan oil spill, the worst in U.S. oil industry history. The spill is still out of control.

Legislation

- March 1—Voting 98 to 1, the Senate confirms Louis W. Sullivan as secretary of health and human services; the Senate votes 99 to 0 to confirm former chief of naval operations James Watkins as secretary of energy.
- March 2—The Senate votes 94 to 0 to confirm Edward Derwinski as the first secretary of veterans affairs.
- March 9—The Senate votes 53 to 47 to reject the nomination of John Tower as secretary of defense.
- The Senate votes 97 to 2 to confirm William Bennett as director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
- March 17—The Senate votes 92 to 0 to confirm Richard B. Cheney as secretary of defense.
- March 22—House Republicans select Newt Gingrich (R., Ga.) as Republican minority whip.
- March 24—President Bush and congressional leaders sign a bipartisan agreement on aid to the contras and support for the Central American peace plan; the agreement calls for a

payment of \$4.5 million a month in nonmilitary aid for the contras through February, 1990; nonetheless, Congress will review the agreement in November, 1989.

March 25—White House counsel Boyden Gray says that the agreement between President Bush and Congress on Central America encroaches on the constitutional powers of the President.

Military

March 28—The U.S. Air Force grounds its fleet of B-1 bombers to find the cause of a malfunction.

Political Scandal

March 3—Former national security adviser Robert McFarlane is fined \$20,000 and sentenced to 2 years on probation for withholding information about the Iran-contra affair from Congress; in March, 1987, McFarlane pleaded guilty to 4 misdemeanor counts.

March 30—In Washington, D.C., the prosecution rests its case in the trial of former National Security Council aide Oliver North. He is on trial for 12 counts related to the Iran-contra arms deal; North's defense is expected to start on April 3.

March 31—Saying that no written evidence has been found to involve the former President, U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard Gesell refuses to subpoena Ronald Reagan as a defense witness in the trial of Oliver North.

Science and Space

March 13—The space shuttle *Discovery* goes into orbit after a successful launch.

March 18—The shuttle *Discovery* lands safely at Edwards Air Force Base a few minutes short of 5 days after launch.

Supreme Court

March 21—The Court rules 7 to 2 to overrule a lower court ruling in a railroad industry case and 5 to 4 to uphold a lower court ruling in a U.S. Customs Service case; in these specific instances, federal drug testing programs are constitutional.

March 22—The Court unanimously upholds a lower court and rules that the system of representation on New York City's Board of Estimate is unconstitutional; this ruling will force New York to revise its government structure.

The Court rules 9 to 0 to overrule a lower court; it says that files in criminal cases belonging to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are never subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

March 29—In a unanimous decision, the Court declares that "the Constitution protects personal religious beliefs as well as formal religious doctrine"; this overrules a lower court decision.

VENEZUELA

March 1—Three days of nationwide rioting against price increases end.

March 3—President Carlos Andrés Pérez announces that Venezuela may reschedule its foreign debt payments because of economic problems; Pérez also says that 300 people died and 800 people were injured in the rioting triggered by price increases.

March 10—In a telegram to President Pérez, Amnesty International says the Venezuelan government should investigate "serious violations of human rights" that occurred during the recent rioting.

VIETNAM

(See also *Intl, ASEAN; Cambodia; Japan*)

March 28—Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach says that the United States should not supply military aid to the non-Communist resistance in Cambodia.

YUGOSLAVIA

March 25—Rioting in Kosovo Province continues for a 3d day, as ethnic Albanians voice their displeasure with increased Serbian influence in Kosovo.

March 27—A curfew is ordered for Kosovo after 2 policemen and a protester are killed in the ongoing violence.

March 28—The violence in Kosovo province worsens as 21 people die in 2 days of rioting by Albanians.

ZIMBABWE

March 10—Defense Minister Enos Nkala says he will resign in connection with corruption charges. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 250)

and was an inspiration to nationalist revolutionaries throughout the third world and to black leaders in the United States. In this biography of Nkrumah, David Rooney traces his career and his eventual downfall. Was Nkrumah an inexperienced ideologue or a competent politician? The contradictions between Nkrumah's personal attitudes and his policies for Ghana made it difficult to build up the country and its political system after independence. Using previously unpublished material (some from the Central Intelligence Agency), Rooney has made an important contribution to understanding the personal dimension in modern Ghanaian history.

D.E.S.

ALSO RECEIVED

A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA: NATION AND STATE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. *By I. M. Lewis.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 297 pages, notes and index, \$29.50.)

ZAMBIA: BETWEEN TWO WORLDS. *By Marcia M. Burdette.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 210 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$29.95.)

DEMOCRACY AND PREBENDAL POLITICS IN NIGERIA: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC. *By Richard A. Joseph.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 237 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

THE ETHIOPIAN TRANSFORMATION: THE QUEST FOR THE POST-IMPERIAL STATE. *By John W. Harbeson.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 239 pages, bibliography and index, \$32.50.) ■

Erratum: We regret an error in Robert Satloff's article in our February, 1989, issue. Page 88, line 1 in the left column should not contain a reference to footnote 11. The proper reference to this footnote can be found in the right column of page 104.



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